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Abstract
The Third Chapter1 The aim of this research is to study individual choices of precau-
tionary saving and long-term care spending when an individual faces the uncertainty of
after-retirement health shocks. To do this, an improved two-period life-cycle model is
employed. This paper also explores how individual choice affects economic development
and capital accumulation in an overlapping generation economy. The study shows that the
rise in the possibility of getting after-retirement health shocks will result to an increase in
long-term care expenditure and the level of precautionary saving. The steady state will
also increase in this case.
The Fourth Chapter The increasing and intensifying long-term care (LTC) demand
brings great financial pressures for both governments and individuals. From the public
perspective, the underlying economic question is how adequate real resources can be re-
distributed to support long-term care need and how efficient the policies targeting is. As
many LTC policies are accessed through means tests, individuals saving behaviour can
be affected. This paper examines and compares the welfare effects that different means-
tested policies have on individuals. We did this by embedding life-cycle models with
after-retirement health shocks. Means-tested policies of long-term care, one with a top-
up choice, and one without, were then simulated. The results show that the means test
regime with a top-up option can bring a higher social welfare. Under this scheme, a
higher means test threshold can decrease societys dependency on a social benefit system
and increase social welfare.
The Fifth Chapter Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance are the dis-
ability cash benefits provided for people who are over 65 in the U.K. As the government
plans to divert more public resource from these benefits to means-tested local care ser-
vices, it is important to understand the effects and targeting of these cash benefits first.
1The Third Chapter and the Fourth Chapter are co-authored with Prof. Gareth D. Myles
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Using the survey data from English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, this study examines
the relationship between the receipt of disability cash benefits and recipients’ character-
istics among those who are over 65 in England. Although income is not a key factor to
decide on the receipt of the benefits in the criteria, the results show that it still has a self-
selection process where the benefits are given to those who are both most in need and on
low incomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Long-term care (LTC), as Chen (2001) puts it, generally refers to “a range of medical,
social, personal care, and supportive services required by people who have lost the ca-
pability of self-care due to long-term disability or chronic illness.” While LTC services
are delivered to younger disabled groups, the majority of LTC recipients are older people.
The need for LTC is rising significantly.
Demographic change is one of the reasons behind the increase in the need for LTC. On
average across OECD countries, the share of the population aged over 65 years increased
from less than 9% in 1960 to 15% in 2010 and was expected to nearly double in the next
four decades to reach 27% in 2050. The growth in the proportion of the population aged
80 years and over will be even more dramatic. 4% of the population were 80 years old
and over in 2010 (OECD, 2015). Also, life expectancy at aged 65 increases significantly.
In OECD countries, life expectancy has been rising by 5.5 years on average for both men
and women since 1970. Some of the factors explaining these gains include advances in
medical care combined with greater access to healthcare, healthier lifestyles and improved
living conditions before and after people reach the age of 66. In addition, structural effects
like immigration and the baby boom generation also have very significant effects on the
aging population and the rise of LTC demand.
The rapidly growing LTC need brings great financial pressures for both the individuals
and the government. Long-term care cost can bring great uncertainty to individuals’ lives.
According to Palumbo (1999), the likelihood of a typical 65-year-old person entering a
nursing home during his or her lifetime is 43%. Once admitted, the average stay in a long-
term care facility exceeds one year. For people who have to pay out-of-pocket, admission
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to a long-term care facility can quickly deplete one’s financial wealth. The increasing
and intensifying demand for LTC support is also a challenge to the government. An
OECD report shows that, total public spending on LTC accounted for 1.7% of GDP on
average across OECD countries, which is a significant share of LTC services funded from
public sources. However, most people still see themselves as underinsured. Currently, the
challenges that the insurers are facing include increasing public awareness of LTC costs
and challenges, risk monitoring and designing innovative and robust solutions for both
wealth accumulation and protection products (Castries, 2009).
The British government has the same concern about LTC. In the U.K., according to Falk-
ingham, et al (2010), the population of the U.K. is becoming older. The number of people
aged 65 and over in the U.K. grew by 6%, from 7.9 million in 1981 to 9.9 million in 2008.
At the same time, the older population itself has been aging. Indeed the fastest-growing
age group in the entire population is the one aged 85 and over. The population of the U.K.
aged 85 and over in 2008 already represented 2.1% of the total population. The increase
in LTC demand was substantial.
LTC provisions in England are in two parallel systems. One is cash benefits provided
at the state level, which are mainly Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Living
Allowance (DLA). The other is social care services operated by local authorities. The
entitlement of an individual to get such help from local authorities requires an assessment
on a means test.
Current policy discussions on care provisions focus on new arrangements regarding the
means test. In fact, the government announced their plan to increase the upper capital
threshold in the means test from £23,250 to £118,000 and the lower capital threshold will
be raised from £14,250 to £17,000. Under this policy, any people who have capital under
£118,000 will receive some help when they are in need of eligible care. However, this
policy is delayed to come into effect in April 2020. It seems that the government is trying
to go in the direction of increasing the benefits coverage to a larger crowd holding more
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capital. According to Hancock et al, (2013), the projected cost of social care services
and care related disability benefits for older people in 2030 will increase to £25.5 billion
(in 2010 prices), which will be more than double the cost of 2010, £12 billion. As a
percentage of GDP, the increase in the cost is not that steep from just under 1% to 1.3%
by 2030. They also project that in 2030, the new government plans will bring 115,000
more care receivers under public funding than if the current system continued.
The increasing and intensifying need for LTC and the financial concerns had led to broad
discussions. On account of the financing of LTC, three studies have been carried out and
are constructed into this thesis.
Future uncertain long-term care cost is meaning a greater motivation for young individuals
to save. In the first chapter, by embedding a life-cycle model with the factor of after-
retirement health shocks, individual choice on LTC expenditure and savings are specified.
The effects of individual choice on the capital accumulation process and the steady state
level of the whole economy are also examined.
A Means test is an important method used by governments in LTC provisions. The in-
teractions between individuals’ savings and LTC spending are affected differently when
the parameters of the means test change. Means-tested social welfare policies may drive
individuals to reduce their savings. But how this affects the whole economy needs to
be analysed further. The second study examines individuals’ behaviour under different
means test designs and investigates the question of how efficient these different means
testing policies are.
The third paper is an empirical research focusing on the significance of effective targeting
of the non means-tested cash benefits in the social care system in the U.K. With the
government trying to divert more resources to means-tested social care services provided
by local government, it is necessary to understand the benefits and the effectiveness of
the state cash benefits. To find out who are really targeted by the disability cash benefits
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and whether the actual outcomes meet the original purpose, it is necessary to estimate the
influence of the decisions’ outcomes and test the features of the recipients. This helps us
understand better how disability cash benefits are distributed across different income and
disability levels and the way that pattern differs from the stated aims under the design of
the system.
The first two studies are theoretical and the third one is empirical. They focus on in-
vestigating individuals’ behaviour, changes in the economy and public policies, taking
different perspectives of LTC and using multiple methods. This project helps the pub-
lic have a better understanding and interpretation of the economic phenomena of an aging
economy. It can also assist the government to introduce more useful policies on long-term
care and accelerate the process of having better solutions in the system for underinsured
individuals. In this case, the public provisions will be more effective and efficient.
The thesis is organised as follows. The second chapter is the literature review. The third
chapter presents the study of precautionary saving and long-term care expenditure in an
overlapping generation economy. Chapter Four looks at individual saving behaviour and
the welfare consequences of alternative means-testing policies. The study of the target-
ing and effectiveness of disability benefits for long-term care in England is included in
Chapter Five.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This section mainly reviews the literature on precautionary saving behaviour under future
uncertainties and how the life-cycle model is applied in this area. Other relevant literature
is introduced in the following chapters separately.
Precautionary saving has become an essential component of economic behaviour and the
subject of much research. The proportion of how much precautionary saving occupies
the aggregate household wealth has been researched. The results range from 2% (Guiso,
Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992) to 60% (Dardanoni, 1991). Regardless of the controversial
results, the importance of precautionary saving cannot be neglected.
Precautionary saving is motivated by future uncertainty. Caroll and Samwick (1998)
found that there is a significant empirical relationship of wealth, precautionary saving,
and log of variance of income. By setting the uncertainty to the minimum, they found
that the amounts of precautionary saving shrunk by 45%. For those who were aged less
than 50, up to a third of the total wealth was held as precautionary savings against the
uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty is a vital function shaping households’ consumption and
saving behaviour.
To test which uncertainty affects consumption and saving behaviour specifically, the un-
certainty of longevity has been examined. The lifespan uncertainty helps to explain house-
holds’ consumption decisions and has certain effects on the slow rate of saving reduc-
tions among elderly households (Davies, 1981; Skinner, 1985; and Engen, 1993). Davies
(1981) also discovered that under a life-cycle model where only an uncertain lifespan
was considered, elderly households spent their financial assets much more slowly than
optimal, which means other factors exist affecting household consumption behaviour.
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Back in 1963, Arrow (1963) stated that the risk due to factors like nutrition and clothing
were far below the risk due to the uncertainty of medical care for households. Extensive
research has been devoted to studying the role of medical care. In the early 1970s, Gross-
man (1972a, 1972b) conducted investigations where health was first treated as a capital,
and medical care was first treated as an investment towards this capital. This model is
well known as the human capital model, and is used to test the demand for health. It
has become a great inspiration for many researches and has been treated as the basis for
much research in this sector. In 1977, random factors of illness and death, which are
assumed to have effects on health capital, were introduced into the life-cycle model to
examine the investments in health capital (Cropper, 1977). In 1998, another factor, the
uncertainty of incidence of illness was brought into this model by Picone et al. (1998).
They improved Grossman’s model, making it a simplified dynamic model in which pre-
cautionary behaviour was considered. Picone et al. found that people who are risk-averse
often choose to increase their medical care cost when they face future uncertainty. Instead
of decreasing consumption, they often choose to spend their savings on medical care cost.
Future healthcare expenses, especially those derived from nursing home care influence the
saving and consumption decisions of elderly households greatly, bringing random shocks
to their pensions or savings. Such uncertainty becomes a strong motive for precautionary
saving behaviour (Palumbo,1999).
The literature about precautionary saving has mostly been focused on the uncertainty of
lifespan and not on medical care expenses until Kotlikoff (1989). He pointed out that the
risk of morbidity is hard to quantify, while mortality can be used for quantifying lifespan
uncertainty. Kotlikoff (1989) improved on the simple life-cycle model. He introduced and
assigned probabilities to the health expenditures based on one’s past health expenditures,
as the causes of the expenses are uncertain or independent.
The life-cycle model has been widely used in studies of consumption decisions, saving
behaviour and wealth accumulation. The simple life-cycle model was initially created by
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Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Ando and Modigliani (1963). One of its hypotheses
was that a retired household member should allocate his or her wealth and spend it each
year that they expect to live on average. However, afterwards, some studies found that
this simple life-cycle model does not reflect actual situations. According to the literature
in the 1970s and early 1980s, in studies by White (1978), Mirer (1979) and Danziger et al.
(1982, 1983), when the elderly retired, instead of having a decreasing wealth, their savings
showed an increasing trend as they grew older. After that, King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982)
and Diamond and Hausman (1984) in the 1980s argued that the savings normally increase
only in the first few years after retirement and then they decrease along with age, a finding
which is more convincing.
Kotlikoff (1989) used a two-period life-cycle model and included the distribution of med-
ical care expenses during the test of precautionary saving and uncertain healthcare pay-
ments. In this model, an individual’s life is divided into young and old period. They
work only in the first period, but consume in both periods. The savings in the first pe-
riod plus the interest become the consumption in the second period. When individuals
are in the second period there is a possibility for them to become ill. Expenditures on
medical care can bring them back to health. Individuals can choose to pay the fees, or
not to pay as the insurance can cover the cost. Another choice individuals have is to use
the government’s program but under the sacrifice of assets. Kotlikoff (1989) simulated
and examined the consumption and saving behaviour under four different regimes taking
the microeconomics data interest rate into consideration. He simulated a life-cycle model
with 55 periods, where the last 35 periods are the second period. He found that the aggre-
gate savings can be explained largely by precautionary saving rising by future uncertain
health expenditures. Moreover, this uncertainty of health expenditure can bring an ex-
tra one third of long run savings and also a decrease in the state wealth level. Palumbo
(1999) comments that perhaps the significance about Kotlikoff (1989) was that he pointed
out that the medical expenses are incurred independently over time. However, the allo-
cation of the probabilities of random variables was stylized, and a theory model which
was not based on empirical observation was used. But this study definitely provided great
16
inspirations for future empirical and theoretical researches.
After this, more researchers have taken future uncertain health expenses into consideration
when precautionary behaviour is being investigated. Hubbard et al. (1994a) argue that the
medical expenses, lifespan and uncertain earnings are the most important uninsured risks.
The life-cycle model incorporated these three factors of uncertainty is built to explain the
distribution of wealth holdings among the American households.
Then Hubbard et al. (1995) found that although the life-cycle model indicates that house-
holds keep saving money for their retirement consumption, a sizable proportion of the
population always holds no wealth. So besides the uncertain future health expenditure,
medicaid programmes also have effects on the households’ saving behaviour. As more
factors were taken into consideration, the research started to study the heterogeneity ef-
fects and the interactions of assets-restricted programmes like Medicaid with precaution-
ary saving behaviour. This was an important step in the study where the role of Medicaid
was truly considered. In this study, the simple life-cycle model and dynamic program-
ming model were analyzed separately to explore the relationships between welfare pro-
grammes and precautionary saving behaviour. Great differences exist between the two
results. Social insurance programmes affect the saving behaviour of both actual and po-
tential recipients. This is because even if people do not encounter out-of-pocket medical
expenses, the prediction or realization of them still has potential effects.
On saving behaviour, Hubbard et al. (1995) suggest that, by using a life-cycle model of
consumption and saving affected by uncertainty, households with different earning levels
have different saving levels. Households with lower lifetime income tend to have incon-
sistent saving behaviour and little wealth accumulation even during their high-income
periods (before retirement). On the other hand, for households who have a relatively high
lifetime earning level, wealth accumulation behaviour is consistent. Significant savings
can be achieved before their retirement. The situation of holding no wealth is more likely
to happen to low-income households, which can be seen as behaviour to maximize the
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utility of asset-based, means-tested welfare programmes. In the case of precautionary
saving behaviour, low-income households prefer to reduce their savings to qualify for the
subsidy program.
In 1999, studying the choices of consumption levels of elderly households, Palumbo
(1999) created a dynamic, structural health uncertainty model of household consump-
tion decisions in which uncertainty of future health expenses was well considered. He
used data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and explained the slow rate of
dissolving wealth among American elderly households. Palumbo (1999) highlights the
fact that, in the health uncertainty model, households optimally maintain additional finan-
cial wealth to offset potential out-of-pocket medical expenses of the future. The model
used differs from the normal life-cycle model by treating out-of-pocket medical expense
as happening randomly. Moreover, longevity was treated as unpredictable. Instead of as-
signing probability theoretically and giving specified households’ preference by simulat-
ing models like previous studies, this study estimated probability distribution as random
variables using micro data. Moreover, Polumbo included data in his health-uncertainty
model. He used distribution functions in the life-cycle model to involve micro-date to
estimate medical expenses. Introducing the parameters of uncertainty allows for precau-
tionary saving to be examined not only when people are in young period but also during
their retirement.
It has been found that, among elderly Americans, uncertain out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses are an important motive for people to save as a precaution. For a typical couple,
the proportion of precautionary saving arising from this uncertainty accounts for 7% of
their annual consumption during their early retirement. The sizeable amounts of pre-
cautionary saving due to uncertain medical expenses are still not sufficient to explain
completely why elderly Americans hold their wealth in their early years of retirement.
Studies of the interactions between precautionary savings and healthcare have evolved
into studies on healthcare quality, and multiple risks, which is a more practical and com-
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prehensive approach.
In 2006, the question of how healthcare quality affects economic inequality and precau-
tionary saving behaviour was tested by Jappelli et al. (2006). They found through ob-
servation that patients in places with poor healthcare quality need to wait for a long time
before treatment, thus health shocks have much worse effects on them. Italian microe-
conomic data was used in this research to indicate geographic quality differences. The
study revealed that districts with lower quality have greater incomes and more precau-
tionary savings. Additionally, the unequal distributions of healthcare quality may be a
good explanation of the economic inequality and saving decisions. Jappelli et al. also
provided insights into the validity of the life-cycle model and policy implications for the
design of healthcare system. Their research helped to explain why people are not dissolv-
ing their savings during their early retirement and tried to give a solution to the problems
of unequal distributions of healthcare.
Considering factors other than Medicaid and lifespan, Vidangos (2009) conducted a study
on household welfare, precautionary saving and social insurance under multiple risks.
The model employed assumed that the households’ earnings were subject to variations in
health shocks, unemployment, job transformation, wages, work hours and income. The
research found out that fully insured disability, health and unemployment did not weigh
much in explaining the precautionary behaviour. However, what the insured shocks bring
to the wage and residual component of households’ income are significantly larger gains
compared to other factors. Moreover, these two shocks accounted for more than 60% of
precautionary savings.
Recently,the topic of aging population and long-term care problems has led to many dis-
cussions. Long-term care has also become a specific uncertainty when the interactions of
precautionary savings are studied.
In 2007, Hemmi et al. (2007) conducted a study investigating the interactions between
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individuals’ precautionary saving behaviour and their decisions of whether to pay for
after-retirement health shocks (ARHS). On the basis of the life-cycle model from Kot-
likoff (1989), a simple growth model was built, in which the expected utilities of paying
or not paying for the (ARHS) were compared. This study shows that in an underdevel-
oped economy where households have a decreasing or low income, they do not like to pay
for ARHS as it costs more. Individuals choose not to have precautionary savings under
such condition. However, when the economy is developed and people have an increasing
or a high income, once their incomes reach a certain level, they choose to pay for ARHS.
There are also some other studies, which have focused on different aspects of long-term
care. Wouterse et al. (2012) used the Latent Markov model and tested the relationship be-
tween health and healthcare expenditures. Compared to the individuals with poor current
health and high health expenditures, individuals with good current health and low health-
care expenditures tended to have higher expenditure on long-term care in the future. The
expectancy of the cost-saving effects should not be too high. De Meijer et al. (2011)
conducted a study on the determinants of long-term care spending. Instead of treating
time-to-death as the main determinants of the LTC expenditures traditionally, the control
for disability was introduced, and this shows that individuals who live alone or died from
diabetes, mental illness, stroke, respiratory and digestive disease have high LTC expendi-
tures. Long term care insurance is also a very heated subject. Gupta (2007) produced a
study, in which optimal decisions of investment, consumption, as well as long-term care
insurance purchase are given to help people make better choices.
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Chapter 3
Precautionary Saving and Long-term Care Expenditure
in an Overlapping-generation Economy
3.1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) is the provision of assistance and services to people who, because
of disabling illness or conditions, have a limited ability to perform basic daily activities
such as bathing, cleaning, and cooking. It is a problem mainly, but not exclusively, for the
elderly (Cremer, et al, 2017). It is known that ageing populations have become the norm
in many countries and also a challenge for most developed countries, and the demand for
long-term care (LTC) has increased dramatically.
The tremendous long-term care cost is becoming a major concern for both the public
and households. Individuals often see themselves as underinsured (Catries, 2009), and
those who are over 65 years old have a 43% chance of entering a nursing home. Once
admitted, the average stay in a long-term care facility exceeds one year (Palumbo, 1999).
Because nursing home cost are virtually uninsured, admission to a long-term care facility
can quickly deplete a person’s finances (Palumbo, 1992). Precautionary saving, as Leland
(1968) suggests, is due to the future income being random rather than terminating. Large
amounts of unexpected future expenses for long-term care will become a key motive for
young people to save.
Getting health shocks and bearing the LTC cost when individuals are old affects individ-
uals’ choices on consumption and precautionary saving decisions. Furthermore, changes
will affect the capital accumulation process and the steady state level of the whole econ-
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omy. To explore this problem, this study makes the parameters of savings and LTC ex-
penditure interact in a setting of a two-period life-cycle model with after-retirement health
shocks (ARHS). It then presents an analysis of capital accumulation in an overlapping
generations economy. The shocks give an additional reason for investing in capital rel-
ative to an economy without the shocks. The idea is to explore the consequence of the
shocks for the growth path and the long-run equilibrium of the economy.
Since the 1990s, many studies have focused rigorously on the issue of precautionary sav-
ing in response to after-retirement health uncertainty. Hubbard (1994a; 1994b; 1995) and
Palumbo (1999) suggest that future health uncertainty results in great precautionary sav-
ing motives and plays an important role in individuals’ consumption and saving behaviour
over a life cycle. Hemmi et al. (2007) examined the precautionary saving motives arising
from the decision of whether to pay for after-retirement health shocks. They found that at
low levels of income, individuals choose not to save to finance the cost of after-retirement
health shocks. However, when their income is sufficiently high, they choose to finance
these shocks.
The changes in individuals’ behaviour of consumption and saving due to after-retirement
uncertainty also have significant effects upon the capital accumulation and development of
the economy. Jitsuchon and Saito (1995) demonstrated that the degree of heterogeneous
uninsured idiosyncratic shocks tightly relate to the cross-country differences in saving
and per-capital growth. Rodriguez (1999) suggests that precautionary saving has more
significant effects when the economy where households also save against idiosyncratic
risks is compared to an economy where only wages and interest are considered (Skinner,
1988; Caballero, 1991).
Rodriguez (1999) found the introduction of idiosyncratic risks in Solow’s growth model
opens the gate to multiple steady states. Hemmi et al. (2007) discovered that the saving
behaviour bringing to a growing economy gives rise to multiple steady state equilibrium.
Mizushina (2009) completed a theoretical study on the effects of intergenerational trans-
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fers of healthcare using overlapping generation model. The study also suggested that
long-term care may lower the steady state level of capital in the economy. However, the
steady state level of welfare may be enhanced by long-term care in an aging economy.
Comparing to previous literatures, this paper contributes to take the research further into
the area to study more specifically on the uncertainty of future LTC spending. It also
improves the two-period life-cycle model by introducing the assumption that the spending
on LTC after ARHS cannot recover individuals’ health states to those before experiencing
the shocks, which can reflect better of the real-life situations. This assumption can be
widely used on models studying precautionary behaviour under health uncertainties
This chapter is organized as follows. Section Two reviews a model of individual choice.
Section Three embeds the model of individual choice within an overlapping generations
economy. Section Four conducts an analysis of the overlapping generations economy.
3.2 Individual Choice
The life of each individual is divided into two periods. In the first period, the individual
works, consumes, and saves. In the second period, the individual is retired and lives off
accumulated savings. If the individual suffers ARHS then savings are divided between
consumption and healthcare cost. When there are no ARHS then savings are consumed.
There are no bequests. The level of saving that is chosen takes into account the probability
of ARHS and the effect that the ARHS have upon quality of life.
In this individual choice utility function, the level of consumption in the first period is
denoted by cy. Every individual faces the same probability p, that they will suffer ARHS.
The level of consumption in period 2 when ARHS occur is denoted by ch, and by cg
consumption when it does not. The effect of ARHS is to reduce the quality of life in
the sense of reducing the level of utility derived from any given level of second-period
consumption. If ARHS occur, the impact can be reduced by expenditure, h, on healthcare.
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The level of healthcare expenditure is chosen after the ARHS are realised but the saving
to fund healthcare is chosen before.
The lifetime level of utility is
U = u(cy) + β[pu(d(h)ch) + (1− p)u (cg)], (3.1)
where β ≤ 1, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 . The term d(h) represents the impact of ARHS on
effective consumption after mitigation by healthcare expenditure of h ≥ 0 . It is assumed
that d(0) < 1 , so that, in the absence of healthcare expenditure, the ARHS reduce the
effective level of second-period consumption and, hence, the level of utility obtained from
any given level of consumption. It is further assumed that
0 < d(h) < 1, d′(h) > 0, d′′(h) < 0. (3.2)
So, although a health shock reduces the level of effective consumption, some of the reduc-
tion can be restored by healthcare expenditure. It is not possible to restore all consumption
through expenditure on healthcare.
The individual supplies a single unit of labour in the first period of life. Under this as-
sumption the budget constraints facing the individual are
cy = w − s, (3.3)
ch = (1 + r)s− h, (3.4)
cg = (1 + r)s, (3.5)
where w is the wage rate, r is the rate of interest, and s is the level of saving. Substituting
from (3.3) to (3.5) into the utility function gives
U = u(w − s) + β[pu(d(h) ([1 + r] s− h)) + (1− p)u([1 + r]s)] (3.6)
The form of utility in (3.6) reveals the range of effects that ARHS have upon the incentive
to save. In the state that an ARHS occurs then higher saving is necessary to pay for
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healthcare to mitigate the effect. The ARHS reduce the effective level of consumption for
any given level of saving and affects the marginal utility from additional saving. It can be
observed that following ARHS
MUs = d(h) [1 + r]u
′ (d(h) ([1 + r] s− h)) , (3.7)
so that for given s the MUs is increased by lower effective consumption but decreased by
the direct effect of d(h). The net effect upon the incentive to save depends on the balance
of these two effects.
The first-order necessary conditions for choice of s and h are
Us ≡ −u′(w − s) + βd(h)[1 + r]pu′(d(h)([1 + r]s− h))
+β[1 + r](1− p)u′ ([1 + r] s) = 0, (3.8)
Uh ≡ d′(h)([1 + r]s− h)− d(h) = 0. (3.9)
To have a preliminary analysis, total differentiations of these necessary conditions demon-
strate the effects of wage rate and the possibility of ARHS upon the levels of saving and
planned care expenditure. The calculation of comparative statics is in the appendix.
The results show that wage rate has a positive relationship with saving and planned care
expenditure, and an increase in the wage rate raises the level of both parameters. The
effects of an increase in the possibility of ARHS on these depend on the term du′
(
ch
)−
u′ (cg) . If it is positive then an increase in the probability of ARHS will raise saving and
care expenditure. However, this can be negative in which case an increase in p will reduce
both saving and care expenditure. Clearly, ch < cg, so with concavity it follows that
u′
(
ch
)
> u′ (cg) . However, d < 1 captures the impact of ARHS. A more severe ARHS
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is captured in a lower value of d and this pushes in the direction of du′
(
ch
)− u′ (cg) < 0.
If this effect is sufficiently strong an increase in the probability of a very severe health
shock will most likely reduce saving and expenditure on healthcare. Now a specific utility
function of individual choice will be introduced and simulations will be carried out to
examine the interactions of parameters in further.
The increase or the decrease of the possibility of the ARHS can have different results
on the savings and the spending on LTC. The intuitions are, when individuals face the
increasing possibility of ARHS occurring in the old period, they can either increase their
savings to prepare for the future increasing LTC cost, or they can increase their spending
to improve their current health and decrease the savings for the future to prevent health
shocks.
3.2.1 Example
It is worth developing an example to explore the possibilities. This example is employed
to provide a numerical simulation of how the parameters are related and also to lay the
groundwork for the overlapping-generation economy that is introduced below.
The lifetime level of utility is
U = ln(cy) + β
[
p ln
(
δ
[
1 +
1− δ
δ
h
1 + h
]
ch
)
+ [1− p] ln (cg)
]
(3.10)
with δ < 1. This specification implies that
d (h) = δ
[
1 +
1− δ
δ
h
1 + h
]
.
It can be observed that
d(0) = δ < 1, d(h) > 0 ∀h > 0,
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and
lim
h→∞
d (h) = 1.
Hence, the ARHS reduces effective second-period consumption and cannot be entirely
mitigated by any finite level of healthcare expenditure.
Using the budget constraints, utility becomes
U = ln(w− s) +βp ln
((
δ + [1− δ] h
1 + h
)
((1 + r)s− h)
)
+β [1− p] ln ((1 + r)s) .
This can be factored to give
U = ln(w−s)+βp ln (δ + h)−βp ln (1 + h)+βp ln ((1 + r)s− h)+β (1− p) ln ((1 + r)s) .
The necessary conditions for the choice variables s and h are
− 1
w − s + βp
1 + r
(1 + r)s− h + β (1− p)
1
s
= 0,
and
1
δ + h
− 1
1 + h
− 1
(1 + r)s− h = 0.
These necessary conditions can be resolved into
−(1 + β)(1 + r)s2 + β(1 + r)ws+ (1 + β(1− p))hs− β(1− p)hw = 0,(3.11)
(1− δ)((1 + r)s− h)− (δ + h) (1 + h) = 0.(3.12)
(3.11) can be written as
(1− δ)(1 + r)s = δ + 2h+ h2,
so that
h = max
{
0,
√
(1− δ) (s(1 + r) + 1)− 1
}
,
For those cases in which h > 0, the optimal s solves
−(1+β)(1+r)s2+β(1+r)ws+(s− β(1− p) (w − s))
(√
(1− δ) (s(1 + r) + 1)− 1
)
= 0.
The implications of these first-order conditions are now investigated by inserting parame-
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ter values and computing an implicit plot. With the variables are set at δ = 0.25, r = 0.05,
p = 0.2, β = 1 the solution for h as a function of s is
h =
√
0.75 (s(1.05) + 1)− 1,
hence s is the solution to
−2.1s2 + 1.05ws+
(√
0.75 (1.05s+ 1)− 1
)
(1.8s− 0.8w) = 0.
Computing the solutions a range of values of the wage rate give the results reported in
Table 1. For the data in the table the elasticity of saving with respect to the wage rate
is 0.998 while the elasticity of healthcare expenditure is 0.941. The elasticity of d with
respect to the wage is 0.3.
Table 3.1: Simulation Results of the Individual Choice
w s h d
2 1.0291 0.2492 0.3996
3 1.5479 0.4032 0.4655
4 2.0644 0.5413 0.5134
5 2.5792 0.6677 0.5503
6 3.0927 0.7848 0.5798
7 3.6050 0.8945 0.6041
8 4.1166 0.9980 0.6246
9 4.6274 1.0962 0.6422
10 5.1376 1.1899 0.6575
11 5.6473 1.2797 0.6710
A comparative statics exercise to analyse individual choice can be conducted by plotting
the pair of first-order conditions and then considering the effect of parameter changes.
The calibrated necessary conditions are plotted in Figure 3.1 for δ = 0.25, r = 0.05,
p = 0.2, β = 1 and w = 10. The intersection of the u-shaped curve (the solutions to
(3.12) is with the higher line (one branch of the solution set for (3.11)) gives the choices
identified in Table 3.1. A change in w only affects the line. An increase in w shifts the
curve up, so both s and h rise. The probability only affects the line. An increase in p
pivots the curve about the vertical intercept and makes the gradient steeper. Hence, h and
s rise. An increase in δ shifts this curve up, which reduces h and s.
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Figure 3.1: Simulations of necessary conditions
Summarising, for the parameter values δ = 0.25, r = 0.05, p = 0.2, and w = 10,
1. dh
dw
> 0, ds
dw
> 0
2. dh
dp
> 0, ds
dp
> 0
3. dh
dδ
< 0, ds
dδ
< 0
The analysis of the decision faced by the individual demonstrates how the possibility af-
fects the saving decision and the expenditure on healthcare. Intuitively, individuals with
higher income choose to accumulate their savings and consume more on LTC expendi-
ture. When the possibility of getting an ARHS increases, the precautionary savings and
the planned care spending increase. With an increasing chance of experiencing health
shocks in the future, the LTC spending increases, and individuals choose to increase pre-
cautionary savings. A larger δ indicates a less severe ARHS. So the results show that a
more severe ARHS drives individuals to save more and have more planned care spending.
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3.3 Overlapping Generation Economy
The next step is to embed the model of individual choice with ARHS into an overlapping
generations (OLG) economy framework. This will permit an analysis of the intergener-
ational distribution of the burden for elderly care and the effect that it has upon capital
accumulation.
The basic idea underlying the analysis is that all consumers are the same when young,
and face the same probability p for the occurrence of ARHS. When a generation is old the
probability for an individual becomes the proportion of the population that is affected by
AHRS. So, based on the assumption that the population is sufficiently larger, a proportion
p of the population suffers ARHS every period. The occurrence of ARHS divides the old
consumers into two types that have different consumption patterns and life outcomes.
The key economic effect is that expenditure on healthcare is subtracted from the output
which is available for consumption. Output is divided between consumption, saving, and
the cost of healthcare. Hence, healthcare places a burden on the society as a whole.
3.3.1 Consumers
Consider a consumer born at time t. This consumer has preferences given by
Ut = u(c
y
t ) + β
[
pu
(
d(ht)c
h
t
)
+ [1− p]u (cgt )
]
, (3.13)
where the subscript t denotes the year of birth. It is assumed that each consumer inelasti-
cally supplies a single unit of labour. The within-period budget constraints are
cyt = wt − st,
cht = (1 + rt+1)st − ht,
cgt = (1 + rt+1)st.
30
Repeating the optimization analyzed in section Individual Choice generates the consump-
tion and saving functions
cyt = c
y
t (wt, rt+1, p) , (3.14)
cht = c
h
t (wt, rt+1, p) , (3.15)
cgt = c
g
t (wt, rt+1, p) , (3.16)
st = st (wt, rt+1, p) ,
plus the level of healthcare expenditures if the consumer is subject to ARHS
ht = ht (wt, rt+1, p) . (3.17)
These functions capture the behaviour of the household side of the economy.
3.3.2 Production
Output at time t, Yt, is produced by a representative firm using a production process with
constant returns to scale in capital,Kt, and labour, Lt. Capital is obtained from the savings
of the consumers in the economy’s single good. The production function is given by
Yt = F (Kt, Lt).
The production function can be written in terms of the output-labour ratio and the capital-
labour ratio as
yt = f(kt),
with yt = YtLt , and kt =
Kt
Lt
. The usual assumption of profit maximization for the firm
implies that the input choices of the firm equate marginal revenue product with factor
prices
rt = f
′(kt), (3.18)
and
wt = f(kt)− ktf ′(kt). (3.19)
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3.3.3 Allocation of Output
The population is assumed to grow at the constant rate n so
Ht+1 = (1 + n)Ht
It is assumed that Ht is large enough (for all t) to ensure that the individual probability of
an ARHS p can be treated as equal to the proportion of population that suffer from ARHS.
When proportion p of the population suffers from ARHS, the division of output between
consumption and capital accumulation must satisfy the condition that
Yt = Htc
y
t + pHt−1c
h
t−1 + [1− p]Ht−1cgt−1 + pHt−1ht + [Kt+1 −Kt] .
Since each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labour, it follows that Ht = Lt.
Dividing through Ht allows the condition for the division of output to be written as
yt = c
y
t + p
cht−1
1 + n
+ [1− p] c
g
t−1
1 + n
+ p
ht
1 + n
+ [1 + n] kt+1 − kt. (3.20)
The allocation of output described in (3.20) demonstrates clearly how expenditure on
healthcare is a real resource cost for the economy. It reduces the consumption that is
available for individuals who experience ARHS and for individuals who do not.
3.3.4 Capital Market
Equilibrium in the capital market requires the stock of capital in time period t + 1 to be
equal to the level of saving in time period t. This requirement implies that
Kt+1 = Htst
= Htwt −Htcyt .
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Using (3.14), (3.18), and (3.19) the capital market equilibrium condition can be written
in terms of the capital-labour ratio
(1 + n) kt+1 = wt − cyt
= wt − cyt (wt, rt+1, p)
= f(kt)− ktf ′(kt)− cyt (f(kt)− ktf ′(kt), f ′(kt+1), p) . (3.21)
Equation (3.20) is the basic first-order nonlinear difference equation for the capital-labour
ratio that describes the evolution of the economy from one period to the next.
Given the time path of the capital stock the factors rewards can be obtained from (3.17),
and (3.18) and demands from (3.13) to (3.15). It is a fact that the demand function for
cyt depends on p results in the time path of capital being dependent on the probability of
ARHS.
3.3.5 Steady State
The steady state is achieved when the capital-labour ratio is constant. This implies that
consumption, saving, and healthcare expenditure are also constant. From (3.20) the
steady-state capital-labour ratio satisfies the identity
(1 + n) k = f(k)− kf ′(k)− cty (f(k)− kf ′(k), f ′(k), p) . (3.22)
3.4 Comparative Statics
The dynamic path for the economy (3.20) and the steady state condition (3.21) can be
used to investigate how the economy is affected by the possibility of ARHS. It is clear
from Section Two that ARHS affect the saving decision of each individual and this must
lead to a change in the aggregate level of capital.
The first step in the analysis is to determine what effect the ARHS has on the path of
capital accumulation. An insight into this can be obtained in the following way. It can be
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assumed that kt is fixed, and the effect of an increase in the probability of an ARHS upon
kt+1 is determined. From (3.20) we have
(1 + n) dkt+1 = −∂c
y
t
∂r
dkt+1 − ∂c
y
t
∂p
dp,
or
dkt+1
dp
=
−∂cyt
∂p
(1 + n) +
∂cyt
∂r
. (3.23)
To determine the sign of (3.22) observe from the capital accumulation condition (3.20)
that
dkt+1
dkt
=
−f ′′
(
kt +
∂cyt
∂wt
)
(1 + n) +
∂cyt
∂rt
.
If consumption when young is normal
(
∂cyt
∂wt
> 0
)
and the process is monotonically in-
creasing
(
dkt+1
dkt
> 0
)
then (1 + n) + ∂c
y
t
∂rt
> 0. When this condition is satisfied, the effect
of the probability p on the next period capital stock, kt+1, depends on value of
∂cyt
∂p
.
From the previous calculations
∂cyt
∂p
=
[d′′ ([1 + rt+1] st − ht)− d′] β [1 + rt+1]
[
du′
(
cht
)− u′ (cgt )]
UhhUss − U2hs
.
So the key determinant of the effect of an increase in p is the term du′
(
ch
) − u′ (cg).
If du′
(
ch
) − u′ (cg) > 0 then ∂cyt
∂p
< 0. This is the intuitive case: an increase in the
probability of each consumer suffering ARHS causes saving to rise to provide finance for
healthcare in the case of bad health. However, it is only worth increasing saving if the
marginal utility of consumption in the case of bad health, du′
(
ch
)
, exceeds the marginal
utility in the case of good health, u′ (cg) . Both these marginal utilities are endogenous
because they are determined by consumer choice but the conditions for consumer choices
do not tie-down this relationship.
For the example in section 3.2 we have ∂st
∂p
> 0 so ∂c
y
t
∂p
< 0. This results in dkt+1
dp
> 0, so
an increase in the probability of ARHS increases the capital stock.
The second step in the analysis is to determine the effect that ARHS have on the steady-
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state capital-labour ratio. This can be obtained by totally differentiating the steady-state
condition (3.21) to determine the effect of p on k. The total differential is given by
dk
[
(1 + n) + kf ′′ +
∂cyt
∂w
kf ′′ +
∂cyt
∂r
f ′′
]
+ dp
[
∂cyt
∂p
]
= 0.
This can be solved as follows:
dk
dp
= −
∂cyt
∂p
(1 + n) + kf ′′ + ∂c
y
t
∂w
kf ′′ + ∂c
y
t
∂r
f ′′
.
The next step is to evaluate the numerator and the denominator. This can be done by
appealing to stability of the equilibrium.
For stability of the steady state we need
−1 < dkt+1
dkt
< 0.
From (20)
dkt+1
dkt
=
−ktf ′′ + ∂c
y
t
∂w
ktf
′′
(1 + n) +
∂cyt
∂r
f ′′
so, if the equilibrium is stable and−ktf ′′+ ∂c
y
t
∂w
ktf
′′ > 0, then evaluated at the steady state
it follows that
(1 + n) + kf ′′ +
∂cyt
∂w
kf ′′ +
∂cyt
∂r
f ′′ < 0.
The key condition is then that
∂cyt
∂w
− 1 < 0
This follows because
∂cyt
∂w
= 1− ∂st
∂w
and we have shown
∂st
∂w
> 0.
So, assuming stability the effect is determined by the sign of ∂c
y
t
∂p
. It then follows from
the discussion above that if du′
(
ch
) − u′ (cg) > 0 then an increase in the probability of
ARHS will increase the steady state capital-labour ratio.
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The conclusion of this section is that ARHS can increase the capital-labour ratio on the
growth path and in the steady state if individuals have an incentive to make additional
saving to finance possible healthcare expenditure.
3.5 Simulations
This section conducts a simulation analysis of the model using the functional forms from
Section 3.2. The intent of the simulation analysis is to show how the growth path of the
economy is affected by changes in the parameters p and δ that describe the extent of the
ARHS problem.
Assuming that the production function is given
f(kt) = k
α
t .
The capital accumulation condition then becomes
(1 + n) kt+1 = (1− α) kαt − cyt
(
(1− α) kαt , αkα−1t+1 , p
)
.
The preferences of a consumer born at time t are based on those from the earlier example
U = ln(cyt ) + p ln
([
δ + [1− δ] ht
1 + ht
]
cht
)
+ [1− p] ln (cgt ) .
The challenge with the example is that there is no explicit solution for the consumption
levels. This implies that the direct approach to obtaining the capital accumulation condi-
tion cannot be used. An alternative approach has to be used that is based on the necessary
condition for consumer choice.
The optimal choice of consumption by a young consumer born at t, cyt , is defined implic-
itly by
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− (1 + β) (1 + rt+1)(wt − cyt )2 + β(1 + rt+1)wt(wt − cyt )
+
(√
(1− δ) ((wt − cyt )(1 + rt+1) + 1)− 1
)
∗ [(1 + β(1− p)) (wt − cyt )− (1− p)wt] = 0
or
− (1 + β) (1 + αkα−1t+1 )((1− α) kαt − cyt )2 + β(1 + αkα−1t+1 ) (1− α) kαt ((1− α) kαt − cyt )
+
(√
(1− δ) ((wt − cyt )(1 + αkα−1t+1 ) + 1)− 1)
∗ [(1 + β(1− p)) ((1− α) kαt − cyt )− (1− p) (1− α) kαt ] = 0
But consumption is given by the output that is not saved to generate capital in t+ 1 , so
cyt
(
(1− α) kαt , αkα−1t+1 , p
)
= (1− α) kαt − (1 + n) kt+1.
Using this relationship
− (1 + β) (1 + αkα−1t+1 )((1 + n) kt+1)2 + β(1 + αkα−1t+1 ) (1− α) kαt (1 + n) kt+1 (3.24)
+
(√
(1− δ) ((1 + n) kt+1(1 + αkα−1t+1 ) + 1)− 1)
∗ [(1 + β(1− p)) ((1 + n) kt+1 − (1− p) (1− α) kαt ] = 0.
The equation (3.23) traces the dynamics. Given a value of k0 the value of k1 can be found
and then the system can be iterated forward. The following figures show the trends of
how k1 change in a Solow growth model given other changed parameters.
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Figure 3.2: Simulations of Stock of Capital for p
Figure 3.2 shows growth paths for different values of the probability of ARHS, and as p
increases, k1 changes from the ones below to the above. The stock of capital increases
more quickly when p is higher, and reaches a higher steady state level. As the possibility
of getting health shocks increases, individuals increase their precautionary saving and
consumptions and healthcare spending in the second period thus the level of capital stock
k1 increases. It shows that the ARHS provide a positive stimulus to capital accumulation
in the calibration.
Figure 3.3: Simulations of Stock of Capital for δ
Figure 3.3 displays the effect of increasing δ. A higher value of δ means that the shock to
health after retirement is less severe. The figure shows that an increase in δ reduces the
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capital stock, as k1 changes from the higher ones to the lower one. The less severe the
health shocks are, the individuals are more likely to decrease their precautionary savings
and their healthcare spending, as well as the consumptions in the second period. Thus k1
shows the trend of falling.
Overall, the simulation matches the conclusion in the last section, and a higher chance of
ARHS happening increases the steady state level. A more severe health shock makes the
capital stock increase.
3.6 Golden Rule
It is worthwhile finding the steady state of the golden rule. The idea is to find out that
what policy with regard to ARHS gets closer to the golden rule.
Take the output division equation
yt = c
y
t + p
cht−1
1 + n
+ [1− p] c
g
t−1
1 + n
+ p
ht
1 + n
+ [1 + n] kt+1 − kt.
Now take this to the steady state
y = cy + p
ch
1 + n
+ [1− p] c
g
1 + n
+ p
h
1 + n
+ nk.
This then gives
f(k)− nk = cy + p c
h
1 + n
+ [1− p] c
g
1 + n
+ p
h
1 + n
So consumption per capita is the same as standard. Hence the golden rule is
f ′(k) = n.
The simulations with the Maple file shows that it is correct but the value of α of the
production function has to be very low for the economy to get anywhere near the golden
rule. I checked the file by working out the model without the ARHS which can be done
explicitly for the log utility. The answer was the same. So the simulations from this point
use a low alpha.
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3.7 Policy
The sources of funding of the long-term care cost of the government are various from
country to country. Most public funding of care benefits relies on tax revenues. Consid-
ering a tax on labour income that is used to make a payment and a subsidy to healthcare
cost to those suffering from ARHS. This section intends to explore how such policy af-
fects capital stock and expected utility.
It is assumed that the government must have a balanced budget every period. This implies
that
τwtHt = pυHt−1,
or
υ =
(1 + n) τwt
p
.
Repeating the construction of the capital accumulation equation gives
−(1 + β)(1 + rt+1)(wt (1− τ)− cyt )2 + β(1 + rt+1)wt (1− τ) (wt (1− τ)− cyt )
+
(√
(1− δ) ((wt (1− τ)− cyt )(1 + rt+1) + 1)− 1
)
∗ [(1 + β (1− p))(wt (1− τ)− cyt )− (1− p)wt (1− τ)] = 0
or
−(1 + β)(1 + αkα−1t+1 )((1− α) kαt (1− τ)− cyt )2 + β(1 + αkα−1t+1 ) (1− α) kαt (1− τ) ((1− α) kαt (1− τ)− cyt )
+
(√
(1− δ) (((1− α) kαt (1− τ)− cyt )(1 + αkα−1t+1 ) + 1)− 1)
∗ [(1 + β (1− p))((1− α) kαt (1− τ)− cyt )− (1− p) (1− α) kαt (1− τ)] = 0
Simulations are carried out with different τ and the setting of δ = 0.25, r = 0.05, p = 0.2,
β = 1 and w = on parameters of h, s, k, v, and the log utility function.
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Table 3.2: Calibration Results of the Policy
τ -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
ν -0.985 -0.651 -0.322 0 0.315 0.621 0.918
s 0.321 0.293 0.265 0.237 0.210 0.184 0.157
h 0.127 0.116 0.104 0.092 0.081 0.069 0.057
k 0.313 0.285 0.258 0.232 0.205 0.179 0.153
EU -0.879 -0.999 -1.130 -1.271 -1.427 -1.599 -1.792
The results from simulating the economy for different tax rates and healthcare payments
are shown in the Table 3.2 above. Individuals with higher savings who have healthcare
cost, also have higher capital and higher expected utility. Those who have high LTC
spending, which are also less healthy people, bring a higher capital state level. This is
because it feeds back into greater saving to cover healthcare costs and this raises the
capital stock.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper studied individual choice in precautionary saving and long-term care spending
when an individual faces the uncertainty of after-retirement health shocks and explores
how individual choice affects the economic development in an overlapping generation
economy. A two-period life-cycle model was employed and developed to study individ-
uals’ behaviour. This model can also be carried out to study problems of long-term or
chronic illness. Many countries are in the process of delivering or improving the LTC
social health system. How the LTC cost affects individuals’ saving behaviour and the
economic capital accumulation is of great significance. This paper can provide great the-
oretical support to policy-makers of social care systems of providing LTC.
The analysis showed that individuals who had a higher income often held more savings
and had more LTC expenditure. A higher possibility or a more severe ARHS generated
higher motivation, and individuals chose to accumulate their savings and increase their
spending on LTC. Meanwhile ARHS can stimulate the steady-state level to increase and
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cause an increase in the capital-labour ratio.
An example of the results is that in China, from year 2000 to 2015, the saving rate in-
creased from 35.8% to 47.1% (OECD, 2017). One of the reasons is the increasing chance
of occurrence of ARHS. In developing countries like China, individuals’ life expectancy
is increasing while economy is booming, and the chances for individuals to get ARHS
are rising. However, on the other hand, the social support system is not complete, and
most of the care expenditure is out-of-pocket money. According to the World Bank, al-
though it had been decreasing, the share of out-of-pocket health expenditure was still as
high as 72% in 2015 (TWB, 2017). Individuals were therefore motivated to increase their
savings.
This paper explored government policy on covering the LTC cost and provided an insight
into how such policy affects capital stock. This can be studied further where instead of
having an equal budget for everyone, the poor people can gain higher subsidy through
government policy although a lower tax is paid. Future research can also consider that
instead of identical individual choice, various choices developed from different levels of
income are possible under the effects of government means-tested policies.
3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Comparative Statics of Individual Choice
Given the Individual Choice in a general case,
U = u(cy) + β[pu(d(h)ch) + (1− p)u (cg)] (3.25)
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The first-order necessary conditions for choice of s and h are
Us ≡ −u′(w − s) + βd(h) [1 + r] pu′ (d(h) ([1 + r] s− h)) + β [1 + r] (1− p)u′ ([1 + r] s) = 0,(3.26)
Uh ≡ d′(h) ([1 + r] s− h)− d(h) = 0. (3.27)
Total differentiation of these necessary conditions gives the effect of an increase in the
wage rate upon the levels of saving and planned healthcare expenditure
ds
dw
=
UhsUhw − UhhUsw
UhhUss − U2hs
,
dh
dw
=
UhsUsw − UssUhw
UhhUss − U2hs
.
It is always the case that UhhUss − U2hs > 0 as the second-order condition for the opti-
mization. Using the facts that
Uhs = d
′(1 + r),
Uhw = 0,
Uhh = d
′′ ([1 + r] s− h)− d′ < 0,
Usw = −u′′(cy),
the comparative statics effects can be calculated to be
ds
dw
=
u′′(cy) [d′′ ([1 + r] s− h)− d′]
UhhUss − U2hs
> 0,
dh
dw
=
−u′′(cy)d′(1 + r)
UhhUss − U2hs
> 0.
Hence, an increase in the wage rate increases saving and the planned level of expenditure
to mitigate an ARHS.
Similarly, the effects of an increase in the probability of an ARHS are given by
ds
dp
=
UhsUhp − UhhUsp
UhhUss − U2hs
.
dh
dp
=
UhsUsp − UssUhp
UhhUss − U2hs
,
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To evaluate these expressions, note that
Uhs = d
′(1 + r),
Uhp = 0,
Uhh = d
′′ ([1 + r] s− h)− d′ < 0,
Usp = β [1 + r] [du
′ (ch)− u′ (cg)] .
The comparative statics effects can then be written in detail as
ds
dp
=
− [d′′ ([1 + r] s− h)− d′] β [1 + r] [du′ (ch)− u′ (cg)]
UhhUss − U2hs
,
dh
dp
=
d′(1 + r)β [1 + r]
[
du′
(
ch
)− u′ (cg)]
UhhUss − U2hs
.
It can be seen that both of these expressions have the sign of du′
(
ch
) − u′ (cg) . If
du′
(
ch
)− u′ (cg) is positive then an increase in the probability of an ARHS will increase
saving and care expenditure. However, this can be negative in which case an increase
in p will reduce both saving and care expenditure. Clearly, ch < cg, so with concavity
it follows that u′
(
ch
)
> u′ (cg) . However, d < 1 captures the impact of the ARHS. A
more severe ARHS is captured in a lower value of d and this pushes in the direction of
du′
(
ch
)− u′ (cg) < 0 . If this effect is sufficiently strong an increase in the probability of
a very severe health shock will most likely reduce saving and expenditure on healthcare.
The effects of an increase in the interest rate are given by
ds
dr
=
UhsUhr − UhhUsr
UhhUss − U2hs
.
dh
dr
=
UhsUsr − UssUhr
UhhUss − U2hs
,
To evaluate these, note that
Uhs = d
′(1 + r),
Uhr = d
′s,
Uhh = d
′′ ([1 + r] s− h)− d′ < 0,
Usr = β
[
du′
(
ch
)
+ (1− p)u′ (cg)]+ β [1 + r] s [dpu′′ (ch)+ (1− p)u′′ (cg)]
Uss = u
′′(cy) + β [1 + r]2
[
dpu′′
(
ch
)
+ (1− p)u′′ (cg)] .
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The comparative statics effects are
ds
dr
= (UhhUss − U2hs)−1 [d′(1 + r)d′s
− [d′′ ([1 + r] s− h)− d′] (β [du′ (ch)+ (1− p)u′ (cg)]+ β [1 + r] s [dpu′′ (ch)+ (1− p)u′′ (cg)])] ,
dh
dr
= (UhhUss − U2hs)−1
[
d′(1 + r)
(
β
[
du′
(
ch
)
+ (1− p)u′ (cg)]+ β [1 + r] s [dpu′′ (ch)+ (1− p)u′′ (cg)])
− [u′′(cy) + β [1 + r]2 [dpu′′ (ch)+ (1− p)u′′ (cg)]] d′s] .
Further constraints are needed before we can make a conclusion on how the interest rate
affects individual choice in a general sense.
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Chapter 4
Individual Saving Behaviour and the Welfare
Consequences of Alternative Means-tested Policies
4.1 Introduction
Long-term Care (LTC) is currently provided in many developed countries, but the way
it is organized varies. Some countries provide LTC in a variety of settings, including
short-term or long-term institutionalization, home based and ambulatory services; some
have the provision of care shared between the family, public and private sectors; and
some establish different boundaries between the health and social care services. The
access to LTC services is usually means-tested (European Commission, 2008 ;Kraus et
al., 2010). This is the case in England, which has a National Health Service (NHS) and
health and social LTC services are delivered to the population under different schemes.
LTC provisions in England are in two parallel systems. One is cash benefits provided
at a state level, and the other is social care services operated by local authorities. The
entitlement of an individual to get such help from local authorities requires an assessment
using a means test.
A means test is an important design that many countries have adopted for the popula-
tion to access social care benefits. Through an assessment against an individual’s assets
or income, it allows governments to target benefits to poorer households. Governments
can flexibly adjust the margins of the targeted group by setting different parameters in
the means tests. It can also help governments to control spending on relevant benefits.
However, the means test has been criticized for having the disadvantages of discourag-
ing individual savings and work efforts, thereby creating dependence on the welfare state
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(Sefton et al., 2008).
The demand for long-term care (LTC) services faces a considerable increase due to the
population aging and the changes in the family structure. The pressure of providing and
paying for long-term care has become a major concern for not only individuals, but also
for the health system and policymakers. Many countries are striving to make policy re-
forms on LTC benefits, including the efforts to increase the coverage of the benefit poli-
cies. For instance, in England, the government plans to increase the upper capital thresh-
old in the means tests of the local LTC services from £23,250 to £118,000, and the lower
capital threshold from £14,250 to £17,000. Such a change aims to benefit more people to
receive public provisions. However, besides the huge increasing benefits outlays, the in-
centives for more individuals to spend their savings may rise. Thus it is vital to understand
the effects of the changes in means-tested policies on the individuals and the economy.
One research question is that how the changes in a means test affect individuals’ sav-
ing behaviour, consumption choice, and the welfare state facing a future uncertainty of
LTC spending. In addition, this paper proposes to answer how adequate real resources
can be redistributed to support long-term care needs and how efficient the targeting is
of means-tested policies. This paper addresses these questions by focusing on testing the
welfare effects that means-tested policies with different threshold and subsidy levels bring
to different groups of individuals across income and health levels. We mainly consider
two regimes of means-tested LTC policies in this research. One is not allowing a top-up,
which means that the individuals who pass the means test and have government support
can only use what is given. For example, if an individual is qualified to get government
support of a three-hour volunteer help, or a free stay in a care home but in a lower stan-
dard room, he or she is not allowed to upgrade the care service to more hours or to a
better room. The second regime of means-tested benefit policy modeled in this paper al-
lows a top-up. This policy provides the option for qualified recipients to pay on top of
the acquired public support. Taking the same example, after being qualified for the care
services or a care home room, an individuals is allowed to have an option to choose to
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have better services, at an extra cost using their own finance.
These two regimes of means-testing for LTC services or LTC allowance are very com-
monly adopted. In a system where the LTC benefit system targets to provide the basics
of LTC to the people having the least wealth, the initial state is to introduce a system
where individuals have some allowance or have access to certain services. Depending on
the design of the system, these LTC services within the system can be very limited. It
involves the system to be better organised to intergrade the services for the government to
use before the recipients have the options to top up on the covered services.
For example, in China, the governments support on LTC is not systematic. In some rural
areas, the LTC based on appointed clinic beds can be covered if you are qualified for
means-testing programmes (e.g. Wubaohu), but the services you are allowed to have
are targeted and you cannot choose to have more advanced services, e.g. upgrading the
hospital bed, or appointing home care services. While in England, the LTC systems allow
individuals to wave or choose their care services to some extent after they are entitled to
the government funding of their LTC services. One important reason for this to happen
is that the local authorities of England are in charge of planning and carryout of the LTC
services and choosing LTC institutes. Within the system, all the LTC resource is under
control by the government. Thus the differences between the two regimes are more of the
differences of the entire LTC systems. It is important to demonstrate the differences on
the outcomes from the perspectives of individual utility and social welfare level of these
two regimes, so that the policy makers can make more informative and rational decisions
in designing the LTC benefit systems.
A life-cycle model with after-retirement health shocks (ARHS) is firstly embedded, in
which individuals choose the consumption and the spending on long-term care over their
life-cycle. The funding methods of their long-term care cost after experiencing ARHS
include personal savings and government support. Then after constructing individual
choices under the two regimes of means-tested LTC policies, welfare functions are ap-
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plied. Meanwhile,under each means-tested LTC policy, the paper gives a thorough anal-
ysis of how an individual’s saving behaviour changes when facing different government
subsidies and means-tested thresholds. The welfare consequences of alternative means-
tested policies are investigated and compared.
The results show that under a means-tested LTC benefit which does not allow any top-up,
if the government is facing a fixed budget, it should reduce the means-tested threshold
and increase individual subsidy to achieve a higher social welfare. For the means tests
which allow a top-up, the policies that have a higher means-tested threshold and a lower
individual subsidy can achieve a higher social welfare. Comparing the two regimes, the
means test with the top-up option can bring a higher social welfare. It has a wider coverage
of recipients, but it also requires a higher cost.
The next section is an explanation of the individual’s life-cycle model. Section Three
and Section Four contain the models and simulations of the two schemes of means-tested
policies. The paper gives a conclusion in Section Five, where further analysis, limitations
and future studies are discussed.
4.2 Literature Review
Future long-term care can be treated as an uncertainty, which has an influence on people’s
precautionary behaviour of saving. The literature review in the opening of the thesis dis-
cussed many studies on precautionary savings and future uncertainties, such as earnings,
medical spending and the length of life. Many studies have also included the effects from
social policies.
In order to examine the implications of different financing mechanisms for random health
expenditures for the macroeconomic saving rate, Kotlikoff (1989) constructed models
under the regimes of no insurance, actuarially fair insurance, actuarially unfair insurance,
and incomplete insurance provided through a government program somewhat similar to
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the U.S. Medicaid system. The results showed that introducing actuarially fair insurance
to the economy with uncertain health expenditures reduces the steady state level of wealth
by 12%. Switching from the fair insurance arrangement to a Medicaid type program with
an asset test further reduces steady state wealth by 75%.
While studying the role of uncertainties in motivating people to save, Hubbard et al.
(1994b) also considered the effects that come from taxing and from means-tested so-
cial welfare programs. They constructed a general multi-period life-cycle model before
they estimated the stochastic processes using available cross-section and panel data sets
on households. They simulated the income and asset histories of low-wealth individuals
and found out that the ones who had lower wealth were still in the same state in the years
after. The saving behaviour was discouraged by the implicit tax associated with increasing
assets. By contrast, households with higher levels of wealth were less likely to qualify for
social insurance programs, so that saving was less discouraged. Considering the impact
from the social welfare programs on individuals’ savings, Zhao (2017) studied the impact
of social insurance on individual choices and welfare. Applying a dynamic general equi-
librium model with uncertain medical expenses and individual health insurance choices,
he found that social insurance not only distorts saving and labor supply decisions, but also
has an effect on the reductions of private health insurance in the U.S..
Although there are plenty studies that consider the effects of public welfare policy on
precautionary saving against future uncertainty of health spending, research which further
applies life-cycle models to study policy design of means test is limited. However, the
design on means-tested pension scheme has been discussed a lot. Means test in pension
scheme is more complicated, the adjustment of means test is usually through the change of
taper rate or marginal tax rate. Apart from the consumption/saving decisions, the studies
on the means test of pension schemes also take into considerations the effects of the
work/leisure decisions made by people of working age.
Sefton et al. (2009) used a dynamic programming model to consider the effects of a policy
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reform that reduced the marginal tax rates on private income of means-tested retirement
benefits from 100% to 40%. Their analysis suggests that policy reform can encourage
the poorest third of all households both to save more and delay retirement, and have the
opposite effects on richer households. Kumru and Piggott (2009) extended this approach
using a large scale general equilibrium stochastic overlapping generations model cali-
brated to UK data. They found that a 100% taper rate for a means test is optimal. In
trying to find the optimum design of means-tested pension design, Fehr and Uhde (2014)
modelled an economy without social security, and then introduced pension systems of
various institutional designs and compared the costs arising from liquidity constraints as
well as distortions of labor supply and the accumulation of savings. They identified a pos-
itive role of means-tested pension benefits against private assets from a long run welfare
perspective.
4.3 The General Model
4.3.1 Individual Choice
Individual choice U describes expected lifetime utility of an individual considering the
effects of health shocks and healthcare expenditure, where U ′ > 0 , U ′′ < 0 . This
is constructed based on the life-cycle model implemented by Modigliani and Brumberg
(1954), Ando and Modigliani (1963), Kotlikoff (1988) and Hemmi et al. (2007).
U = ln(cy) + βp ln
(
(δ +
h
a
)ch
)
+ β(1− p) ln (cg) . (4.1)
The life-cycle model of individual choice contains two periods. Individuals work, con-
sume and save in the first period, and retire and live off the savings in the second period.
Utility is derived from the consumptions of the two periods. The key feature in this paper
is that in the second period of the model, there may be a health shock which will induce
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long-term care. The effects of the health shock can be reduced by expenditure on long-
term care, but they cannot be offset completely. Each individual takes into account the
probability of suffering a health shock when choosing the lifetime consumption plan.
In the model, cy is the individual’s consumption of the first period of life. When a person
is in the second period an after-retirement health shock (ARHS) occurs with a probability
p (p ≤ 1) . ch is the level of consumption in period 2 when an ARHS occurs, while
cg is the consumption when it does not occur. When an ARHS occurs the effects can
be reduced by h , which is the expenditure on long-term care. The level of healthcare
expenditure is chosen after the ARHS is realised.
The idea in the model is that after an ARHS, before healthcare is paid (h = 0), the health
shock reduces the individual’s effective consumption to ln(δch). As healthcare expendi-
ture, h, increases, the level of effective consumption ln((δ + h
a
)ch) also increases. The
utility improves due to the receipt of care, and a positive relationship between healthcare
expenditure and effective consumption. The effectiveness of δ+ h
a
is determined by con-
stant a and it is implicitly assumed to satisfy the condition δ + h
a
< 1 . This is justified
by the fact that the level of h is restricted by the individual’s budget constraint, and the
effectiveness of consumption cannot be restored to the level in the absence of an ARHS.
This specification of the model implies that once the ARHS occurs, the bad effects it has
on health cannot be fully removed. The discount factor β ≤ 1 is applied to the second
period utility.
Consumption of the first period cy is equal to the total income w minus the savings s .
When individuals move into the second period of life, savings with interest added, (1+r)s,
finance the consumption when old. Moreover, in the situation that an ARHS occurs,
savings also have to finance any health expenditure that is made so, for the retirement
period, ch = (1 + r)s − h, where h ≥ 0 . Thus, the model has the following budget
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Table 4.1: Variable list of Individual Choice Model
cy Consumption in the first period
ch Consumptions in the second period if one has health shocks
cg Consumptions in the second period if one does not have health shocks
δ The bad effects from health shocks, 0 < δ < 1
h Long-term care expenditures if one has health shocks
a A constant that is set to be large enough to make δ+ h
a
< 1
β Discount factor in the second period
p Possibilities of the individuals getting health shocks in the second period of life
w Wages that individuals get in the first period
s Savings from the first period
constraints,
cy = w − s,
ch = (1 + r)s− h,
cg = (1 + r)s.
So the utility function of individual choice becomes,
U = ln(w − s) + βp ln
(
(δ +
h
a
)((1 + r)s− h)
)
+ β(1− p) ln ((1 + r)s) . (4.2)
It is assumed that there is a population of individuals with incomes between [w,w] dis-
tributed evenly along the density function f(w). All individuals have the same preferences
of choices and the same probability of having an ARHS. The government does not ob-
serve income directly but can observe the level of wealth (savings plus interests).
4.3.2 Policy Description
As mentioned above, the consumption of individuals in the second period is (1 + r)s,
and we can define the individuals’ wealth level in the second period as W , and W =
(1 + r)s. The benefits policies considered in this paper are based on the means-testing
policy (Ω, hp).
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We assume that there exists a wealth threshold of Ω from the government to determine
whether an individual is eligible for the given public provisions hp, in which Ω = (1 +
r)sp, and sp is the means test threshold of the individual saving. It needs to be mentioned
that, the determinations of the level of Ω are not considered in this paper, along with the
role of taxation. It is the change in Ω and hp and its effects on individual behaviour and
the economy that we need to examine.
Any change in Ω or sp can be interpreted as the government trying to change the targeted
benefits recipients, either increasing the benefit coverage to a wider crowd to achieve a
higher fairness, or decreasing the benefit threshold to a poorer group to provide public
provisions to those who are most in need. The variable hp represents individual subsidy
or personal allowance in the means-tested benefit policy once an individual becomes a
benefit recipient.
Two different provision schemes of means testing policies will be analyzed and compared;
the first scheme does not allow individuals to top up, and the second one allows the top-
up. Under both schemes, the elderly who have wealth under Ω are qualified to receive
public provisions for healthcare, while those whose wealth is larger than Ω have to bear
the entire cost of health care by themselves. The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate how
social welfare is affected by such variations in the government means-tested policies.
Scheme 1. No top-up
Scheme 1 does not allow top-up. This means when those who are qualified are provided
with public funded healthcare, they are not given the option of getting more or better
care even if they intend to top up the service or cash benefits using their own money.
In this case, the government provides healthcare hp to individuals with wealth less than
Ω. Individuals who qualify for the public provision must spend the amounts of hp on
healthcare.
Scheme 2. Top-up
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The effects of permitting a top-up of government provision are also considered. If in-
dividuals are qualified for the government provided provisions for healthcare, they can
choose whether to pay more to upgrade the service or get better package. So in the model
of Scheme 2, government provides hp to eligible individuals who are also given options
to make additional expenditure, ht (ht ≥ 0), on healthcare. Some people will choose to
top up, and some will still just consume the public provisions. In this case, individuals
who pass the means tests have the healthcare expenditure of hp or hp + ht.
4.4 Individual Choice Under Different Saving Behaviour
- Scheme 1
The first scheme provides a fixed level of healthcare subsidies after eligibility determined
by a means test. Once the means tests are passed, individuals’ LTC cost will be covered
by public provisions, and no top-up is allowed. Any individual with wealth above the
cut-off level is responsible for providing their own care. This gives a motivation for some
individuals to keep savings lower than or on the threshold level to pass the means test.
So this gives us incentives to construct three utility functions along income. The first
utility is for the individuals who have savings under the threshold and pass the means
tests. The second utility is to describe those who should have savings above the threshold
but intentionally keep savings under the thresholds to pass means tests. The last utility
function represents those who do not pass the means tests and pay for the healthcare using
their own finance
The means test is passed if the level of wealth W is less than or equal to Ω. Denoted by
sp, this is the maximum possible saving level to pass the means test. Hence
Ω = (1 + r)sp. (4.3)
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and,
W = (1 + r)s (4.4)
For people who save s > sp and fail the means tests, the healthcare cost h has to be
covered by themselves. The utility in their second period of life following an ARHS is
ln{(δ + h
a
)ch}. (4.5)
where
ch = (1 + r)s− h. (4.6)
For people who save an amount s ≤ sp and pass the means tests, public healthcare sub-
sidies of hp is provided to cover their healthcare spending. The healthcare spending in
their second period h = hp , and the utility of their second period of life with following
an ARHS is,
ln{(δ + h
p
a
)ch}, (4.7)
with
ch = (1 + r)s. (4.8)
These distinct outcomes result in three different indirect utility functions which are now
derived. Group 1 consists of the individuals whose wage level is below wp , and wealth
level W is under the means-test level Ω , who qualify for the government provision hp of
long-term care spending. When the wage level is between wp and w∗, individuals reduce
their savings intentionally to remain qualified for the government provision. Individuals
in this stage are Group 2. After the wage level hits w∗, individuals tend to prefer to save
more for their future rather than spending more. The individuals whose wage level is
above w∗ will be classified as Group 3, and this comprises those who have to pay for the
long-term care using their own finance.
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The utility function of type U1 is given by
U1 = ln(w − s) + βp ln
(
(δ +
hp
a
)(1 + r)s
)
+ β(1− p) ln ((1 + r)s) . (4.9)
max
{s}
U1 = ln (w − s) + βp ln
(
δ +
hp
a
)
+ β ln((1 + r)s). (4.10)
Taking the first order condition regarding s,
∂u1
∂s
= − 1
w − s +
β
s
Making ∂u1
∂s
= 0, so the necessary condition for the choice of s gives
s =
β
1 + β
w, (4.11)
so indirect utility is
U1 = ln
(
1
1 + β
w
)
+ βp ln
(
δ +
hp
c
)
+ β ln(
β(1 + r)
1 + β
w). (4.12)
The means test will be passed provided that
β
1 + β
w ≤ sp, (4.13)
or
w ≤ Ω
1 + r
1 + β
β
. (4.14)
Hence for individuals in the income range [w,wp] , where wp = Ω
1+r
1+β
β
, the optimal
level of saving is consistent with passing the means test.
Now w∗ is defined as the income level at which an individual saves sufficiently over the
government threshold and fails the means test. It is clear that w∗ > wp since individuals
just above wp have an incentive to keep savings low in order to pass the means test and
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benefit from government provided healthcare. Hence, for income levels w in the range
wp < w < w∗ , the saving level is kept artificially low at sp . The indirect utility function
then becomes
U2 = ln(w − sp) + βp ln
(
(δ +
hp
a
)(1 + r)sp
)
+ β(1− p) ln ((1 + r)sp) . (4.15)
U2 = ln(w − sp) + βp ln
(
δ +
hp
a
)
+ β ln ((1 + r)sp) . (4.16)
Since sp = Ω
1+r
,
U2 = ln(w − Ω
1 + r
) + βp ln
(
δ +
hp
a
)
+ β ln (Ω) (4.17)
≡ U2 (w,Ω; β, δ, p, r)
For individuals that save more than sp there is no access to government funded healthcare
so h has to be personally financed. The individual optimizes by choosing both h and s .
The indirect utility function U3 is then defined by
U3 = ln(w − s) + βp ln
(
(δ +
h
a
)((1 + r)s− h)
)
+ β(1− p) ln ((1 + r)s)
max
{h,s}
U3 = ln(w−s)+βp ln(δ+ h
a
)+βp ln((1+r)s−h)+β(1−p) ln((1+r)s). (4.18)
The first-order conditions for h and s give
∂U3
∂s
= − 1
w − s +
βp(1 + r)
(1 + r)s− h +
β(1− p)
s
, (4.19)
∂U3
∂h
=
βp
a(δ + h
a
)
− βp
(1 + r)s− h . (4.20)
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These equations can be solved to give
h = h(w; β, δ, p, r),
s = s(w; β, δ, p, r).
The indirect utility function can then be written
U3 = ln(w − s(w; β, δ, p, r)) + βp ln(δ + h(w; β, δ, p, r)
a
)
+βp ln((1 + r)s(w; β, δ, p, r)− h(w; β, δ, p, r)) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)s(w; β, δ, p, r))
≡ U3(w; β, δ, p, r). (4.21)
These indirect utility functions permit the value of w∗ to be determined. w∗ is the income
level at which an individual saves sufficiently over the government threshold and fails
the means test, which also means this is the income level at which individuals determine
that purchasing care is preferable to keeping saving artificially low. The value of w∗ is
determined by the equality of U2 and U3
U2 (w
∗,Ω; β, δ, p, r) = U3(w∗; β, δ, p, r). (4.22)
The implications of these calculations are illustrated in the Figure 4.1. In the figure, W
indicates a person’s wealth level in the second period of life,
W = (1 + r)s
s(w) =
W
1 + r
The first figure depicts the three indirect utility functions and the construction of the in-
come level w∗. The second figure displays the path of saving. Individuals who have
different level of savings can be categorized into three groups according to income level.
Those with income w ∈ [w,wp] pass the means test without having to restrict saving
and receive the government healthcare hp. Their savings as a function of w follow path
s(w < wp). At income level wp saving becomes constant at sp in order to ensure the
means test is passed. It remains constant until income level w∗ is reached. This is the
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Figure 4.1: Saving behaviour under Policy Scheme 1
Figure 4.2: Groups of individuals under Policy Scheme 1
saving path s(wp < w < w∗). Once income level w∗ is exceeded the saving level line of
this group of individuals becomes s(w > w∗).
The three groups represent individuals who make different savings choices with conse-
quences for the funding of long-term care spending. We assume the wage level in the
economy ranges from w to w. Social welfare consists of three different components rep-
resenting the different indirect utlities. Social welfare level of this economy is given by
SW =
∫ wP
w
U1(w)f (w) dw +
∫ w∗
wp
U2(w)f (w) dw +
∫ w
w∗
U3(w)f (w) dw. (4.23)
Assuming that the individuals are distributed uniformly along the wage line, then
f(w) =
1
w − w . (4.24)
Using the indirect utility functions
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Table 4.2: Variable list of social welfare of Scheme 1
w Individuals’ wages in the first period
s Individuals savings in the first period
β Discount factor in the second period
p Possibilities of the individuals getting health shocks in the second period of life
h Individuals’ long-term care expenditure
hp Personal allowance or individual subsidy of the means tested benefit
a A constant set to be large enough to make δ + h
a
< 1
w Lowest wage level in the population
w Highest wage level in the population
wp The critical point of income between Group1 and Group 2
w∗ The critical point of income between Group2 and Group3
SW =
1
w − w
[∫ wP
w
(
ln (w − s) + βp ln
(
δ +
hp
a
)
+ β ln((1 + r)s)
)
dw
+
∫ w∗
wp
(
ln(w − sp) + βp ln
(
δ +
hp
a
)
+ β ln ((1 + r)sp)
)
dw (4.25)
+
∫ w
w∗
(
ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)s− h) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)s)
)
dw
]
.
This social welfare function is used to evaluate the alternative policies.
For any government policy {Ω, hp} , the cost of that policy in terms of public provisions
of LTC is
k =
(
1
w − w
)
(w∗ − w)hp. (4.26)
Alternative policies are evaluated taking this cost into account.
Through this section, three different individual choices under the no top-up scheme are
analysed, and based on these, a social welfare function has been produced. The next
section will explore the case under the top-up LTC policy scheme.
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4.5 Individual Choice Under Different Saving Behaviour
- Scheme 2
Scheme 2 permits individuals below the cut-off to top up the long-term care provided by
the government. The government provides public provisions hp to eligible individuals
with wealth less than Ω. Eligible individuals can choose to make expenditure to increase
LTC provisions to hp + ht, where ht ≥ 0. The key question is whether individuals under
the threshold will choose to purchase a top-up and pay for extra care from their own
resources.
For people who have savings under the threshold sp and make the choice to top-up, the
utility in the second period of the individual choice is
ln{(δ + h
p + ht
a
)ch}, (4.27)
and the budget constraint is
ch + ht = (1 + r) s. (4.28)
The point denoted by w∼ where w∼ < wp is a wage level below which people benefit
from public subsidies but do not have the option to top up. When individuals have an
income level larger than this point and lower than the government threshold, which is
w∼ < w < wh, they have an option and will choose to top up on the public provisions.
First let us describe the first type of people who do not have the option to top up, in which
w < w∼ and ht = 0. The level of utility for the individual is,
U1 = ln(w − s) + βp ln
(
(δ +
hp
a
)(1 + r)s
)
+ β(1− p) ln ((1 + r)s) . (4.29)
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max
{s}
U1 = ln(w − s) + βp ln
(
δ +
hp
a
)
+ β ln (s(1 + r)). (4.30)
This problem has the same solution as for the no top-up case.
∂u1
∂s
= − 1
w − s +
β
s
(4.31)
With ∂u1
∂s
= 0, we have a function of s under the first utility function,
s =
β
1 + β
w,
If an individual chooses to top up the government long-term care, we now have the utility
function of the second type of people.
max
{ht,s}
U2 = ln(w−s)+βp ln
(
δ +
hp + ht
a
)
+βp ln
(
(1 + r)s− ht)+β(1−p) ln ((1 + r)s) .
(4.32)
The first-order conditions for the choice of saving s and top-up amounts ht are
∂U2
∂ht
=
βp
a(δ + h
p+ht
a
)
− βp
s(1 + r)− ht , (4.33)
∂U2
∂s
= − 1
w − s +
βp(1 + r)
s(1 + r)− ht +
β(1− p)
s
.
The necessary condition of U2 regarding ht gives us
s =
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
(4.34)
Meanwhile, the first-order conditions can be solved to provide the solution
s = s (w; β, δ, hp, r, p) ,
ht = ht (w; β, δ, hp, r, p) .
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The corresponding indirect utility is
U2 = U2 (w; β, δ, h
p, r, p) . (4.35)
People who are able to top up ht on public provision only exist when the their income,
w , in the first period of the individual choice is above a certain level w∼. Assume the
matching saving level of w∼ is s∼. Define w∼ by the condition
ht (w; β, δ, hp, r, p) > 0 if w > w∼.
So people of the first type, whose utility function is represented by U1, not only save
under the government means-tested threshold sp, but also save under the saving s∼, get a
subsidy of hp and do not top up. The second type of individual, who saves over the point
s∼, but is still under the point of sp, is given the option of top-up and will choose to top
up. U2 shows the utility function of this type of person. The critical point of U1 and U2 is
w∼ and s∼. It is important for us to know how w∼ is represented according to the utilities.
From the first-order condition of U2 , we know the level of saving is
s =
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
and wealth is
W = aδ + hp + 2ht (4.36)
So, based on the range of ht, W becomes,
W = aδ + hp + 2 max{0, ht(w)} (4.37)
When W 6 Ω
s(1 + r) 6 Ω
aδ + hp + 2 max{0, ht(w)} 6 Ω
If the qualified individuals choose to top-up, ht > 0,
s =
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
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If the qualified individuals do not top up, ht = 0,
s =
aδ + hp
1 + r
From the first-order condition of U2, we know w = 1+ββ s, so, when h
t = 0,
w = (
1 + β
β
)(
aδ + hp
1 + r
) (4.38)
When ht > 0,
w = (
1 + β
β
)(
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
) (4.39)
The critical point of wealth concerning whether people choose to top up is,
W = aδ + hp. (4.40)
Under the government wealth threshold, when W < aδ + hp, individuals will not top up.
But when W > cδ + hp, they will choose to top up and the spending of ht exists. When
the wage level is smaller than w = (1+β
β
)(aδ+h
p
1+r
), individuals will not top up, hence
w∼ = (
1 + β
β
)(
aδ + hp
1 + r
) (4.41)
s∼ =
aδ + hp
1 + r
(4.42)
The third type of individuals are those whose savings reach the point of the government
threshold, but have an incentive to spend more and save less to stay in the government’s
program. Until their incomes reach a point, denoted w∗, where the public provisions are
not worth the extra consumption any more, they will change this behaviour. The level of
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savings for these people stays at sp, and their uitlity is
maxU3 = ln(w−sp)+βp ln
(
δ +
hp + ht
a
)
+βp ln
(
(1 + r)sp − ht)+β(1−p) ln ((1 + r)sp)
(4.43)
According to the previous calculations of U2,
s =
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
The critical point between U2 and U3 provides that,
sp =
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
(4.44)
ht =
Ω− aδ − hp
2
(4.45)
The utility function for the last type describes the group of people whose wealth level is
above the government threshold, and who do not receive public provisions. Their spend-
ing of care is covered by themselves, and it is denoted by h. The utility function is the
same as the individual choice.
max
{h,s}
U4 = ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)s− h) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)s)
The saving behaviour of individuals affected by means-testing allowing top-up is shown
below on the Figure 4.3,
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Figure 4.3: Saving behaviour under Policy Scheme 2
Figure 4.4: Groups of individuals under Policy Scheme 2
The economy allowing a top-up should be made up by four groups of individuals who
have different choices. The Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 have the utility function of U1, U2, U3
and U4.
U1 = ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
p
a
) + β ln (s(1 + r)).
U2 = ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
p + ht
a
) + βp ln
(
(1 + r)s− ht)+ β(1− p) ln ((1 + r)s) .
U3 = ln(w − sp) + βp ln(δ + h
p + ht
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)sp − ht) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)sp).
U4 = U4 = ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)s− h) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)s).
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Table 4.3: Variable list of social welfare of Scheme 2
w Individuals’ wages in the first period
s Individuals’ savings in the first period
β Discount factor
p Possibilities of the individuals getting health shocks in the second period of life
h Individuals’ long-term care expenditure
hp Personal allowance or individual subsidy in a means-tested benefit
ht Top-up payments from the benefit recipients on top of hp
ht The maximum top-up payments recipients will pay
a A constant set to be large enough to make δ + h
a
< 1
w Lowest wage level in the population
w Highest wage level in the population
w∼ Critical point of income between Group 1 and Group 2
wp Critical point of income between Group 2 and Group 3
w∗ Critical point of income between Group 3 and Group 4
SW =
1
w − w [
∫ w∼
w
(ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
p
a
) + β ln(s(1 + r)))dw
+
∫ wp
w∼
(ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
p + ht
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)s− ht) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)s))dw
+
∫ w∗
wp
(ln(w − sp) + βp ln(δ + h
p + ht
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)sp − ht) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)sp))dw
+
∫ w
w∗
(ln(w − s) + βp ln(δ + h
a
) + βp ln((1 + r)s− h) + β(1− p) ln((1 + r)s))dw]. (4.46)
Under this LTC public means-tested policy, a top-up is allowed, and it has four individual
choices forming four groups of people in the population. The next section will investigate
these two schemes of LTC means-tested policies and examine how the factors affect each
other and the economy.
4.6 Simulations
To understand the outcomes due to different factors changing in the means tests, we need
to calibrate the models of the individual choices and the welfare functions under the two
schemes. The idea here is that numbers will be set and put into the variables of possi-
bilities of getting health shocks (p), interest rate (r), severity of the health shocks (δ),
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time factor (β), constant (a), the lowest income in the population (w), the highest income
in the population (w), saving and wealth thresholds of the means test (sp,Ω) and public
provision of LTC for each individual (hp).
Then the level of groups’ dividers of wp and w∗ in Scheme 1, w∼, wp and w∗ in Scheme
2, the aggregate cost of LTC policy k, and the social welfare level SW can be calculated.
By changing the individual subsidy or personal allowance hp or the benefit threshold Ω
and sp, we can find out how w∼, wp, w∗ and SW change as well.
With the respect of the preference parameters that are set fixed through the simulations
in this paper, we set the possibilities of getting health shocks to 25%, the interest rate r
to 0.2, the parameter of severity of health shocks δ to 0.25, the discount factor β to 0.4,
the lowest income to 0, the highest income to 100, and finally the constant a to 30. It is
worth mentioning that the intention of introducing the constant a into the model is not
only to include the factor of severity δ, but also to express the idea that h
a
< 1, where
h cannot exceed a although more spending on LTC may generate higher utility ( h
a
will
increase) but it can never recover to the original status ( h
a
= 1). Mean while, including
the consideration of severity δ, δ+ h
a
< 1. Under this set of number a = 30, and δ = 0.25,
h needs to be in the range of 0 to 22.5.
p = 0.25, r = 0.2, δ = 0.25, β = 0.4, a = 30, w = 0, w = 100 (4.47)
4.6.1 Simulations of Scheme 1
The following results demonstrate simulations under three such conditions. The simula-
tion in Table 4.4 shows what happens when government increases the public provisions of
each individual (hp), while the means test threshold of personal savings (sp) and wealth
(Ω) are kept unchanged. Table 4.5 gives a simulation in which the level of individual
benefit subsidy (hp) remains constant while the means test threshold changes. Another
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Table 4.4: Calibration of Scheme 1 - Change of hp
Ω hp sp wp w∗ k SW w∗ − wp
3.6 5.0 3.0 10.5 16.8931 0.8447 4.1147 6.3931
3.6 6.0 3.0 10.5 17.6450 1.0588 4.1161 7.1450
3.6 7.0 3.0 10.5 18.3249 1.2827 4.1173 7.8249
3.6 8.0 3.0 10.5 18.9485 1.5159 4.1186 8.4485
3.6 9.0 3.0 10.5 19.5263 1.7574 4.1198 9.0263
simulation is put into Table 4.6, and it shows how the variables change if the government
tries to keep the aggregate cost of the policy (k) fixed. In this case, both of the means test
threshold and level of public provisions change.
In the first simulation, as shown in Table 4.4, the means test threshold of personal savings
sp is set to be sp = 3.0, so that Ω = (1 + r)sp = 3.6. The range of hp that used in the
calibration is (5.0, 6.0, ..., 9.0).
While keeping other variables unchanged, when the personal allowance of the LTC benefit
hp increases, the critical point of Group 1 and Group 2 wp is not affected, but the critical
point of Group 2 and Group 3 w∗ increases, and the cost of the LTC benefit policy k
shows an increase, as well as the social welfare level SW . The constant of wp and the
increase of w∗ means that the size of Group 1 does not change, but the size of Group 2
expands. When the government improves the government provisions for each individual
under the unchanged means test threshold, some people are likely to increase their daily
consumption and have less savings to be on the threshold to get qualified to the public
provisions, instead of paying LTC using their own finance. As more people pass the means
test and join the government programmes, the cost of this policy increases. Although the
increase in the population of Group 2 indicates an increasing dependency people develop
for the social benefit system, the social welfare in this simulation still increases. Although
normally if people talk about increasing the coverage of public provisions, they think
of increasing factor like means-tested threshold directly, this table demonstrates that the
change IN the level of personal allowance also affects the coverage to some level.
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Table 4.5: Calibration of Scheme 1 - Change of Ω and sp
Ω hp sp wp w∗ k SW w∗ − wp
1.8 5.0 1.5 5.25 6.7650 0.3382 4.1409 1.5150
2.4 5.0 2.0 7.00 10.4694 0.5235 4.1319 3.4694
3.0 5.0 2.5 8.75 13.7703 0.6885 4.1232 5.0203
3.6 5.0 3.0 10.50 16.8931 0.8447 4.1147 6.3931
4.2 5.0 3.5 12.25 19.8773 0.9939 4.1063 7.6273
Table 4.6: Calibration of Scheme 1 - Constant k
Ω hp sp wp w∗ k SW w∗ − wp
3.0000 5.0 3.0000 8.7500 13.7703 0.6885 4.1232 5.0203
2.4680 6.0 2.0567 7.1983 11.4747 0.6885 4.1218 4.2764
2.1001 7.0 1.7501 6.1253 9.8357 0.6885 4.1377 3.7104
1.8300 8.0 1.5250 5.3375 8.6061 0.6885 4.1424 3.2686
1.6231 9.0 1.3526 4.7340 7.6501 0.6885 4.145 2.9161
The case where the level of government subsidy is held constant and the level of the means
test threshold is raised is shown in Table 4.5. The value of hp is kept at 5.0, values of sp
are 1.5, 2.0, ..., and 3.5, where matching Ω can be calculated.
Increasing the means test threshold can adjust the people that the benefit targets at, thus
a direct influence to create a wider coverage of the public provisions is foreseeable. The
government benefit policy becoming more accessible is reflected in the increase in the
group dividers wp and w∗. This indicates that if the means test threshold of this public
policy increases, more people with higher income and more savings will join the first two
groups and get qualified for the government provisions. Both Group 1 and 2 will expand,
but the size of Group 2 will grow faster. The size of Group 3 will shrink quite rapidly. The
cost of the policy k will increase as expected, but the social welfare SW will decrease.
How government policy (Ω, hp) changes under a constant cost is tested and the simulation
results are shown in Table 4.6. The value of hp is put in first following which the value of
Ω that keeps k constant is searched. The policies (3.0, 5.0), (2.4680, 6.0), (2.1001, 7.0),
(1.8300, 8.0) and (1.6231, 9.0) can generate the same cost that k = 0.6885.
The results suggest that, keeping the cost of policy k constant, a lower Ω and higher hp
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generates smaller values of wp and w∗, and higher values of SW .
This indicates that when government issues a policy on covering an individual’s long-term
care cost under a constant budget, a lower means test threshold and a higher amounts of
subsidy will shrink the size of Group 1 and Group 2 and make less people stay under the
programme. As a result, this condition can achieve a higher social welfare level. To only
pursue a wider coverage of public policies can not increase the social welfare. Instead,
public policies with clear targeting of individuals with lower or the lowest income can
bring higher social welfare in Scheme 1.
In conclusion, under a means-tested regime not allowing any top-up, the population is
categorized in three groups, in which the first group saves under the means test benefit
threshold, the second group saves on the means test threshold, and the third group saves
above the government threshold. The government pays for the LTC spending for the first
two groups. This section shows that, when the individual subsidy increases while other
parameters are kept unchanged, social welfare level increases even though the number
of people in Group 1 is unchanged and that of Group 2 increases. When this regime
faces an increasing benefit threshold but constant individual subsidies, the sizes of Group
1 and 2 both increase, and the social welfare level decreases. Under a constant budget
of policy cost, it is a lower means test threshold and a higher personal allowance that
can generate higher social welfare. In other words, to achieve a higher social welfare
level in the policy regime 1, instead of increasing the benefit coverage, the government
should focus on providing more targeted services, and the more the government provides
to people who are most in need, the higher the social welfare that it will have. Using this
approach also creates minimum dependency from the recipients to the benefit system.
4.6.2 Simulations of Scheme 2
Scheme 2 allows individuals to top up on the existing public provisions if they pass the
means test. Different from the population structure from Scheme 1, this scheme has
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an extra group of people whose long-term care spending is only partly covered by the
government, and partly paid for by the recipients themselves through a top-up. ht is the
amounts that are topped up. As calculated in the previous section,
s =
aδ + hp + 2ht
1 + r
To make ht > 0 when s < sp, the calibration has to satisfy the condition that,
s >
hp + aδ
1 + r
W > hp + aδ
When s = sp, and ht = ht, to make ht > 0, it has to satisfy that,
sp >
hp + aδ
1 + r
Ω > hp + a
The calibrated parameters that are kept constant in the simulations are
p = 0.25, r = 0.2, δ = 0.25, β = 0.4, a = 30, w = 0, w = 100
As different constraints for the values of sp and Ω are applied in Scheme 2, the values
substituted into them are quite different.
The first simulation in Table 4.7 shows the effects of changing hp while holding the
means-tested thresholds Ω and sp unchanged. The values of Ω is set to 20.4, which makes
the values of sp as 17.0. The numbers substituted into hp are (3, 4, ..7). The critical point
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Table 4.7: Calibration of Scheme 2 - Change of hp
Ω hp sp ht w∼ wp w∗ k SW wp − w ∼ w∗ − wp
20.4 3.0 17.0 4.9500 43.7500 56.3499 71.6204 2.1486 3.9428 12.5999 15.2705
20.4 4.0 17.0 4.4500 46.6667 56.7299 74.6413 2.9857 3.9326 10.0632 17.9114
20.4 5.0 17.0 3.9500 49.5833 57.0954 77.3952 3.8698 3.9223 7.5172 20.3358
20.4 6.0 17.0 3.4500 52.5000 57.4408 79.9555 4.7973 3.9118 4.9408 22.5147
20.4 7.0 17.0 2.9500 55.4167 57.7781 82.3662 5.7656 3.9011 2.3614 24.5881
Table 4.8: Calibration of Scheme 2 - Change of Ω and sp
Ω hp sp ht w∼ wp w∗ k SW wp − w ∼ w∗ − wp
18.0 5.0 15.0 2.75 49.5833 50.8810 70.0350 3.5018 3.9203 1.2977 19.1540
18.6 5.0 15.5 3.05 49.5833 52.4372 71.8861 3.5943 3.9208 2.8539 19.4489
19.2 5.0 16.0 3.35 49.5833 53.9945 73.7296 3.6865 3.9213 4.4112 19.7351
19.8 5.0 16.5 3.65 49.5833 55.5529 75.5658 3.7783 3.9218 5.9696 20.0129
20.4 5.0 17.0 3.95 49.5833 57.0954 77.3952 3.8698 3.9223 7.5121 20.2998
of Group 1 and Group 2 is w∼, and as calculated, w∼ is directly affected by the values
of hp. The results suggest that when the government increases personal allowance for the
benefit recipients, all the values of critical points between groups rise. Although the ex-
tent of the increases varies, it still shows the result of more people joining the program;
as individual subsidy increases, thus the aggregate cost of the policy k increases.
Through the calculations of w∼ − 0, wp − w ∼, w∗ − wp, and 100 − w∗, we can have
estimations of the sizes of the four groups of people in the economy. As hp increases, the
rise of w∼ makes the size of Group 1 expand. However, Group 2 shrinks. We can also
observe that the maximum top-up pay-out ht reduces. This shows that as the government
adds more individual subsidy, it relieves the pressure on the individual’s LTC spending.
For some people in Group 2, it is no longer necessary to make the extra top-up to meet
their personal LTC needs, so more people join Group 1. The size of Group 3 increases,
and more people have the incentives to save less to get qualified for the public provisions,
and as a result, more people shift from Group 4 to Group 3. People show an increasing
dependency on the benefit. The social welfare decreases in this simulation.
The second simulation (Table 4.8) is regarding the government increasing the means
test threshold Ω or sp when other parameters especially the personal allowance hp are
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Table 4.9: Calibration of Scheme 2 - Constant k
k Ω hp sp ht w∼ wp w∗ SW wp − w ∼ w∗ − wp
3.58 21.6 4.5 18.00 4.80 48.1250 60.0024 79.6522 3.9283 11.8774 19.6498
3.58 20.9 4.6 17.42 4.40 48.4167 58.2386 77.8283 3.9268 9.8219 19.5897
3.58 20.3 4.7 16.92 4.05 48.7083 57.2424 76.2892 3.9253 8.5341 19.5468
3.58 19.7 4.8 16.42 3.70 49.0000 55.2173 74.7347 3.9238 6.2173 19.5174
3.58 19.1 4.9 15.92 3.35 49.2917 53.6984 73.1645 3.9220 4.4067 19.4661
held constant. The sets of sp and Ω that are substituted into the simulations are sp ∈
(15, 15.5, .., 17) and Ω ∈ (18, 18.6, .., 20.4).
The increase of w∗ indicates that the population joining the benefit programmes increases
and less people are paying for LTC cost entirely using their own finance. But the changes
in the sizes of the groups are different. Group 1 keeps unchanged while the threshold of
the means test increases. Both Group 2 and 3 expand, but the magnitude of the increase in
the size of Group 2 is significant, and that of the size of Group 3 is quite small. The cost of
the policy increases, as well as the social welfare. Although there are increasing numbers
of people receiving benefits in both situations, the increase of the means-test threshold in
Scheme 2 relatively creates less dependency on the system. More people finance the LTC
spending with a combination of public provisions and their own money. Although Tables
4.7 and 4.8 both show an increase in the cost of the policy for the government, the case
where increasing the means-tested threshold can achieve a higher social welfare.
When the government cost of the LTC means-tested benefit k is kept unchanged (Table
4.9), the parameters of the policy (Ω, hp) are set as (21.6, 4.5), (20.9, 4.6), (20.3, 4.7),
(19.7, 4.8) and (19.1, 4.9). Scheme 2 shows a reversing result from Scheme 1, and it is
a higher government threshold and a lower individual subsidy that can generate higher
social welfare. It also brings a downsizing Group 1, an expanding Group 2 and 3, and a
shrinking Group 4. The table also shows that the scope of increase of Group 2 is bigger
than that of Group 3.
Under the regime in which top-up is an option, it has quite different results from the first
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Table 4.10: Calibration of Scheme 1 and Scheme 2
Ω hp wp1 w
∗
1 k1 SW1 w
p
2 w
∗
2 k2 SW2
20.4 3.0 59.5000 67.6796 1.9704 3.8541 56.3499 71.6204 2.1486 3.9428
20.4 4.0 59.5000 70.7542 2.8302 3.8603 56.7299 74.6413 2.9857 3.9326
20.4 5.0 59.5000 74.7486 3.7374 3.8663 57.0954 77.3952 3.8698 3.9223
18.0 5.0 52.5000 68.7571 3.4379 3.9036 50.8810 70.0350 3.5018 3.9203
18.6 5.0 54.2500 70.3135 3.5157 3.8943 52.4372 71.8861 3.5943 3.9208
19.2 5.0 56.0000 71.8310 3.5915 3.8850 53.9945 73.7296 3.6865 3.9213
scheme. Scheme 2 results in four types of groups in the population. The first group
does not have extra savings to pay on top of the public provisions, so the payment for
LTC spending is entirely financed by the government. The second group saves above an
invisible saving threshold but under the government means-tested threshold, where the
individuals of this group have the ability to top up on the given subsidies. The third group
grows some dependency on the system and saves on the means test threshold, and still has
some LTC spending paid by the government. The fourth group saves above the threshold
and pays for the LTC by themselves. The simulations have shown that an increase in just
the personal allowance shows an increase in Group 1 and 3, and a decrease in Group 2 and
4. The group that has to be financed entirely by the government expands, and the number
of people depending on the benefit system increases. The social welfare decreases in this
case. If the benefit threshold is raised, and the personal allowance is kept unchanged, the
size of Group 1 in which people have to depend entirely on the government is unchanged.
The sizes of Groups 2 and 4 increase. The number of people in Group 3 decreases. That
is, more people join the group whose LTC spending is financed by both the government
and themselves. This change in Regime 2 also shows a decreasing dependency from the
individuals on the government’s benefit system. Under a constant budget, it is a higher
means-testing threshold and a lower personal subsidy that can bring higher social welfare.
4.6.3 Comparison
To compare Schemes 1 and 2, different sets of (Ω, hp) are substituted synchronously
into both schemes. When the personal allowance of the means-tested policy hp is held
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constant, the increase of the benefit threshold Ω and sp causes a decrease in social welfare
level of Scheme 1 but an increase of that of Scheme 2. On the other hand, when the means
test threshold is kept unchanged, the increase of personal allowance brings an increase
in the social welfare level in Scheme 1 but a decrease in Scheme 2. The directions of
the change in social welfare for the two schemes are quite different if the parameters of
means-tested policies change. This is due to the structures of the population for the two
schemes being quite different. However, the table shows that Scheme 2 always generates
a higher social welfare level. Although when we just increase individual subsidy in the
benefit policy, the social welfare of Scheme 1 increases while that of Scheme 2 reduces,
the social welfare level of Scheme 2 is still higher than that of Scheme 1, within the
constraints of the calibrations. The critical point w∗ is also higher in Scheme 2. The
top-up option allows more people to get public provisions under the same cost.
Comparing the changes of the groups in the population, for Scheme 1, whether a rise in
the level of subsidy or the benefit while keeping the other one fixed will expand Group
2. Although the increase in subsidy generates a higher social welfare, both ways can
increase the dependency on social benefits. When the policy cost is kept constant, a
reducing policy threshold and an increasing individual subsidy in the means test can de-
crease the number of members in both Groups 1 and 2 and reduce the dependency on the
benefits from people. The social welfare level also grows under such condition. When
the simulations are run in Scheme 2, the increase in individual subsidy while the benefit
threshold is constant makes Group 3 expand and the social welfare decrease. When the
benefit threshold is kept unchanged, and the individual subsidy rises, the size of Group 3
decreases and the social welfare increases. The dependency on the benefit system is more
likely to develop when we just increase individual subsidy in Scheme 2. When the cost
of the policy is kept unchanged a higher social welfare can be generated when the benefit
threshold increases and the individual subsidy decreases. But the number of people in
Group 3 increases, which shows the increasing dependency on the benefits policy.
Comparing between Scheme 1 and 2, the means test allowing a top-up can bring a higher
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social benefit, and have a wider coverage of recipients at the same time. But meanwhile,
Scheme 2 brings a higher policy cost. The intuition behind this result is that a regime with
a top-up option allows not only whose income is below the lowest threshold, but also a
group of people in a higher tier to be qualified to the government benefit on LTC. Thus
the coverage is higher in this scheme. Meanwhile, this scheme motivates more spending
on LTC services in the whole society. Along with this change, the cost of LTC and the
social welfare of the society also becomes higher.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed how the different means-tested LTC benefits affect individuals’
saving behaviour and the whole economy in order to have an insightful understanding
of the means-tested benefit design. A theoretical demonstration has been made based on
a two-period life-cycle individual choice model considering the personal savings and a
future uncertain LTC spending. By analyzing and developing different utility functions
for different types of individuals under the economy, social welfare levels of the economy
were presented. Compared with previous literature, we managed to study LTC spending
under different means-tested policies. Through calibrations and the change in parameters,
the changes in social welfare level of different means-tested policies were tested, and the
changes in each type of population were analyzed. This study cannot only help to shape a
direction to find the optimal means test design for social benefits, but also benefit us into
testing the dependency that the recipients have on the welfare system.
Two schemes of means test design of LTC benefits were modeled and calibrated. The
calibrations of the two means-tested policies show results with great differences. The
reasons are that the changes of policy design generate different motivations for the pop-
ulation to save or consume. Thus some behaviour of the individuals change and create
different types of groups, resulting in different structures in the population. The direc-
tions of change among groups are quite different, resulting in a different result on an
aggregate level. Thus it is necessary to test the design of means-tested policies separately
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and specifically.
This paper has shown that when adopting a means test regime not allowing top-up, when a
government wants to raise the individuals subsidy under an unchanged benefit threshold,
the social welfare level increases although there may be some dependency that develops.
When this regime faces an increasing benefit threshold but a constant individual subsidy,
the social welfare level decreases. If bearing a constant aggregate cost of the policy, a gov-
ernment should lower the benefit threshold and increase the individual subsidy to achieve
a higher social welfare. That is, under Regime 1, the more the government provides for
the poorest individuals, the higher social welfare that there will be.
Under the means-tested policy design which allows recipients to top up, raising the indi-
vidual subsidy while other parameters are kept constant results in a decrease of the social
welfare. Meanwhile, it causes an expansion of the people whose LTC cost is financed
entirely by the government. The dependency on the benefit system also increases in this
case. In this regime, an increase in the benefit threshold can make more people supported
by both the government and themselves, and the dependency from the population on the
benefit system decreases. This is also a design that the government can choose if it has
a constant budget but wants to increase the coverage of the benefit. Keeping the aggre-
gate cost of the policy unchanged, the government undertaking Scheme 2 should raise the
benefit threshold in the means test and target at a wider crowd to be the recipients even if
the personal allowance has to be lower.
Through a comparison of Scheme 1 and Scheme 2, we can find out, if under the same level
of benefit threshold and individual subsidy, Scheme 2 not only covers more recipients but
also has a higher social welfare. However, the choices between Scheme 1 and 2 have to
be discussed specifically considering more factors concerning economy.
The debate about fairness and effectiveness on social welfare has been long. Facing the
pressures of the budget, most governments cannot seek the maximization of both fairness
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and effectiveness. A pursuit of fairness does not necessarily mean the increase of effec-
tiveness. The means test of Scheme 1 prefers effectiveness to fairness to achieve a higher
social welfare. But for Scheme 2, it is the pursuit of fairness that can result in a higher
social welfare. Different designs of means-tested policies require specific analysis of the
actions that the government should take. In the process we can also find out that the in-
crease of the dependency on the system sometimes is inevitable but it does not necessarily
mean the decrease of social welfare.
Although this study has demonstrated a method to analyze means-tested benefit policy,
and how the change in the policy affects individual behaviour and social welfare, it still
neglects some issues in its design by assumption. One is that the benefit thresholds and
individual subsidy of the means tests are given. If the tax factor or a model describing the
government is considered, the research will have more insights for policymakers on the
financing of the LTC cost. This study was constructed from the economic point of view.
In the real world, whether an individual can become a benefit recipient is through more
trivial appraisal of a person’s care needs and wealth status. Rather than having a unitary
standard, individual subsidies vary from the appraisal results. Despite the limitations, this
study has achieved the construction and calibration of an economy with a means-tested
benefit policy and examined economic social welfare levels considering long-term care
cost. Our results should have important implications for public policy regarding means-
tested benefit policy.
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Chapter 5
The Targeting and Effectiveness of Disability Cash
Benefits for Long-term Care in England
5.1 Introduction
Of all the problems an aging population brings, limited coverage of public provisions of
long-term care is a concern for many individuals in different areas of the world. Many
countries are striving to make policy reforms to provide better social care to meet the
increasing and intensifying care demand, including the U.K. government.
In the U.K., the current social care system for older people with disabilities consists of
two parts: means-tested care services arranged by local authorities; and non-means-tested
cash benefits provided by the state.
Most of the public provided social services are run by local government through assess-
ments of an individual’s care needs and wealth level. The local authorities match a per-
son’s needs to the services available. The eligibility criteria, arrangements and overall
care budget vary locally and are decided by local authorities. Although local governments
sometimes work together with charities and voluntary organizations, the government has a
finite budget to cover the overall care needs. Social services arranged by local authorities
attract user charges depending on the users’ financial means.
On the state level, care related benefits, including Attendance Allowance (AA) and Dis-
ability Living Allowance (DLA) are available for those who are aged 65 or older. Dis-
ability Living Allowance, according to the Department of Work and Pension (DWP), is a
tax-free benefit for mentally or physically disabled people with needs of personal care or
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mobility problems. It is non means-tested and non contributory. It can be claimed initially
only by people under the age of 65 but receipt of DLA can then be continued to past age
65 and there is no transfer of DLA claimants onto AA at age 65.A claim for DLA cannot
be initiated after the age of 65 (Pudney, 2010).
Attendance Allowance is only provided for those who are aged 65 or older. The recipi-
ents need to take assessments and provide medical evidence to prove they have had care
needs for at least half a year before they become eligible for this allowance unless the
claimants are in fast track due to terminal illness. Attendance Allowance requires cer-
tain per-contributions but is non means-tested. Comparing to providing for lower-income
people, AA and DLA focus more on the extent of a person’s care needs.
Cash benefits are believed to have great advantages. They emphasize individuals’ choices
and bring great flexibility. Together with the format of direct provision of services from
local authorities, the risk for disabled individuals is reduced by diversification (Hancock
et al., 2009). However, there is an ongoing debate about the role of disability-related
cash benefits as an element of the public programme. Wanless Social Care Review (2006)
argues that the payment of disability-related universal benefits is becoming increasingly
inefficient and difficult to justify as the size of the older, disabled population expands. The
debate about the level, distribution and form of the public provisions never stops (Bound
and Burkhauser 1999; McVicar 2008). OECD (2011) points out that current discussions
on long-term care policies of England concentrates on providing personal care to those
with the lowest income and capital. Moreover, some debates center on the reform of the
social care system, with the possibility of diverting public resources from cash benefits to
extended local provision of care services (Wanless 2006; Department of Health 2009).
Pudney (2010) proposes that the consequences of reform of the current system cannot be
fully considered until the operation of the system is better understood. The fact is that
in the actual process of assessing eligibility, the concepts of disability and need are hard
to define and impossible to translate into an unambiguous set of formal eligibility rules,
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which implies inherently an uncertainty in its operation. It has been pointed out by the
National Audit Office that the rules for deciding entitlement to these benefits are based
on a range of subjective tests that require the decision-makers to reach conclusions based
on the evidence available. Even similar cases can generate different interpretations (NAO
2001, p55). Thus it requires greater scope of judgment, from both claim decision-makers
in assessing claims and from claimants in constructing the strongest possible case.
The underlying focus of these arguments is in fact the significance of effective targeting
of the cash benefits in the social care system. This raises our research questions: Who
are those targeted by the disability benefits AA and DLA? Whether the actual outcomes
meet the original purpose? This paper aims to estimate the decisions’ outcomes and test
the relationships between the receipt of disability cash benefits and the features of the
recipients. Through this, a better understanding can be developed of how disability cash
benefits are distributed across different income and disability levels and how this pattern
differs from the stated aims under the design of the system. This can provide insights for
policy-makers to improve the design of the social system and make the public provisions
more effective and efficient.
The studies on the receipt of disability related allowance and different individuals’ charac-
teristics are around socio-demographic characteristics, education or gender divides. Some
of them also examine the receipt of different disability benefits in the U.K. In all western
countries disability benefits are more often granted to the less educated part of the work-
force than to those who are better off (Valset et al., 2007). Cutrona et al. (2008) found
that free drug samples were given more frequently to uninsured and low-income people.
Back in 1991, in the study of the probability of receiving of Invalidity Benefit (IVB)
and duration of IVB claims, Holmes et al. (1991) discovered that age and health factors
are significant determinants. Areas of poor housing and high unemployment are more
associated with the receipt of IVB and with longer claim durations. IVB was introduced
by the government in the 1970s, and has gradually been replaced by Employment and
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Support Allowance.
In the studies of the disability benefits in the U.K., Pudney wrote several working pa-
pers at Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) (Pudney, 2009; Pudney, 2010;
Hancock et al., 2010; Hancock et al., 2013), one of which explores the relationship be-
tween disability and receipt of the Attendance Allowance using data from the Family
Resources Survey (FRS). It indicates that despite AA being non-means-tested, it is im-
plicitly income-targeting, and lower-income people have a higher probability of receiving
it. Instead of expecting the chance of receiving higher-rate payment depending only on
the extent of care needs, it also depends significantly on income, type of disability and
age (Pudney, 2010).
This study is different from the previous work from the following reasons. It is based
on the claim results of more comprehensive disability cash benefits, including both AA
and DLA. The data of this paper used is from English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing.
Thus the tests on AA and DLA focus more on the elderly. Among the factors that may
affect the outcomes of the receipt of the benefits, the role of individuals’ financial status
is specifically examined. The variable of wealth is considered along with the variable
income. The considerations of both variables make the analysis on financial status more
completed. Looking into income and wealth as key features can not only help determine
how the disability benefits are allocated, but also contribute to investigate the problems of
income and wealth divide.
This study controlled more variables in the features of the recipients, one important new
variable was long-term care cost. Analyzing the role of care cost with the receipt of dis-
ability benefits helps us to estimate directly individuals’ financial burden caused by care
needs. However, this leads to an important issue of endogeneity, which exists between the
receipt of disability cash benefits and the variable of care cost. This concern of endogene-
ity should be raised in testing between disability or care-related benefits and individuals’
care or health spending. But the literature does not really address this problem and solu-
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tions are rare. The consideration of endogeneity in this paper is another advance from the
previous literature. We will use the method of the instrumental variable (IV) to solve the
endogeneity. This process will enlighten the future research in this area.
The next section gives a thorough explanation of the methodology used for this study.
Section Three defines the dataset, the details of variables and carries out some preliminary
analysis. The fourth section reports on the endogeneity problem, instrumental variable
and relevant results. The results and the analysis of the paper follow in the fifth section.
A discussion is given in the sixth section. Finally, section seven draws conclusions.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Probit Model
The main methodology this paper adopted was the probit model, which tests under what
level of the independent variables the dependent variable is most likely to happen. That
is, to find out what features of the participants led to them being more likely to receive
disability benefits.
The dependent variable of the probit model had to be a binary variable, which in this paper
was whether a person received disability benefits. The value of the variable being 0 means
this person did not receive any disability benefits, while 1 means he or she received at least
one disability benefit. The estimated probability of an observation claims any disability
benefit is p. An increase or decrease in the independent variable makes the outcome of
the dependent variable more or less likely to happen.
Assuming there is a latent variable Y ∗ such that
Y ∗ = Xβ + ε, ε ∼ (0, 1) (5.1)
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In the probit model, for dependent variable yi , we observe only
yi =
{
0, if y∗i ≤ 0
1, if y∗i > 0
(5.2)
So,
Pr(y∗i ≤ 0 | xi) = Pr(yi = 0 | xi) = Pr(εi ≤ −xiβ) = Φ(−xiβ) (5.3)
Pr(yi = 1 | xi) = 1− Φ(−xiβ) = Φ(xiβ) (5.4)
Φ(x,β) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution in the
model.
Φ(x,β) =
∫ x,β
−∞
φ(z)dz (5.5)
The coefficient β estimates the relationship between the dependent variable and the in-
dependent variables and it is the sign of the coefficient that we should pay attention to.
The number of the coefficient means the change in the z-score of probability that Y = 1
for each unit of increase of the independent variable. Thus, we also needed to test the
marginal effects in the probit model. The marginal effects indicate the change in the
probability of Y = 1 happening given a one-unit change in an independent variable . For
the jth independent variable the marginal effects are
∂Pr(Y = 1)/∂xj = βjφ(x
,β) (5.6)
The marginal effects depend not just on βj but on the value of xj and all other inde-
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pendent variables. The calculations used the approach of average marginal effects. This
estimator was applied to the data using Stata software.
5.2.2 Instrumental Variable Probit Model
A concern arose during the estimation where long-term care cost and the receipt of dis-
ability benefits may have the problem of endogeneity as the causation may flow in both
directions. Having care need and care spending drives people to claim disability benefits.
But the benefits they receive can be used to pay for care. It has been argued in Pudney
(2009) that the disability benefit AA is unlikely to have a significant causal impact on
whether care is actually received, mainly based on the potential multiple usage of the
benefit and the lack of quantitative reports. But it is natural for us to believe that care
cost should be a necessary spending for people who suffer from disabilities no matter
how they spend their benefits. The problem of endogeneity cannot be neglected. To solve
this problem, instrumental variables (IV) which do not affect the dependent variable but
only affect the endogenous variables needed to be found. The endogenous variables being
considered are informal care cost and formal care cost. As the two forms of care are sub-
stitutive and have a very small correlation coefficient, the variables of Formal Care Cost
(FCC) and Informal Care Cost (IFCC) were applied with different IV. The instrumental
variables were the access to hospitals and the number of household members. The details
of the variables will be discussed in the next section.
Using Newey’s (1987) minimum chi-squared (two-step) estimator, we can apply the method
of IV into probit model analysis. In general,this control function estimator first estimates
the model of endogenous regressors as a function of instruments as the first stage, and
the estimated endogenous variable from the first stage is put into the function with the
dependent variable.
Consider endogenous regressors yki and the dependent variable y1i ,
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yki = x1iΠ1k + x2iΠ2k + vki (5.7)
y∗1i = y2iβ1 + y3iβ2 + ...+ y(p+1)iβp + x1iγ + ui (5.8)
i = 1, ..., N , yki where k = 2, 3..., p + 1 is an endogenous variable, x1i is a vector of
exogenous variables, x2i is a vector of additional instruments, and the equation for yki is
written in reduced form.
β and γ are structural parameters, and Π1 and Π2 are matrices of reduced-form parame-
ters. The error items are of normal distribution. It is required that the number of instru-
ments is equal to or larger than that of endogenous variables . One important assumption
of this model is that (ui, vi), where vi = (v2i, v3i...v(p+1)i) is independent and identically
distributed multivariate normal for all i. To apply the method of IV to the probit model,
we only observe,
y1i =
{
0, if y∗1i ≤ 0
1, if y∗1i > 0
(5.9)
This process was carried out by Stata software with the command of IV probit. It is worth
noting that the IV probit can only be applied to continuous endogenous variables,as the
variables of Formal Care Cost and Informal Care Cost in our case.
5.3 Data and Variables
5.3.1 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA)
The data in this paper was survey data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA). ELSA is a resource of information on the health, social, wellbeing and economic
circumstances of the English population aged 50 and older.
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The data was acquired from ELSA Wave 6, more specifically, from the sections of health,
income and assets and social care, which was collected in Year 2011 and 2012. The
relevant data collection method used in ELSA was a main interview and telephone in-
terviews. The core questionnaire was carried out by Computer Assisted Personal Inter-
viewing (CAPI) in the homes of the participants. A proxy informant was allowed if the
participant was unable (due to physical or mental illness) or unwilling to join the inter-
view. Telephone interviews were also included in the survey if the participants refused to
attend an interview.
Wave 6 conducted 10,601 main interviews, in which 5,685 were with those aged 65 and
over. The response rate of the household contact in this wave was 89%. Observations
with missing data were omitted during our data processing. Our sample was those 5,685
individuals who were over 65, but specific sample size of a different model is determined
by being in that complete set of variables, so it varies slightly from models. Some of our
variables were captured straight from the survey, while for other variables data needed to
be tailored and processed. It is worthwhile to note that the data used directly from the
dataset from ELSA was after imputation. Care cost and the income including benefits
income were in weekly terms. Some of the data was collected at the benefit-unit level,
and it was transformed into the individual level before use.
5.3.2 Variables
Income and wealth are indicators of the participants’ financial status. Among the features
of the recipients of disability benefits, they are the prime variables to look into. They were
examined in the overall probit model first, and were divided into four equal sized groups
and customized into ten dummy variables in the robustness tests.
Total income (TI) is the total after-tax weekly income of participants. It is the sum of
the participant’s employment income, self-employment income, total state pension in-
come, total annuitised income and total asset income, in which total annuitised income
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includes private pension income and annuity income, and total asset income includes sav-
ings, bonds, house rents etc. Questions regarding each kind of income were asked directly
but separately in the survey and with different time unit before imputations. Asset income
was collected with the wealth data and was in benefit units.It was transformed into indi-
vidual unit level when used by applying the variable of BU equivalence scale, which was
provided by the database. The variable of total income used in the probit model takes a
log format. To avoid the missing values when total income equals to 0, total income was
applied with log function after plus 1. Due to the volume of income being large, the extra
1 unit was ignored. The variable of total income shown in the results section for probit
model is in the name of log of total income (lnTI).
Net total wealth (NTW) was acquired from the ELSA dataset directly. It is the sum of sav-
ings, investments, physical wealth and housing wealth after financial debt and mortgage
debt were deducted. As the user guide indicates, total savings refer to the money invested
in ‘safe’ assets such as bank accounts, savings accounts and cash ISAs. Total investments
include money invested on risky assets such as shares, bonds, stocks, shares ISAs and life
insurance ISAs. Physical and house wealth being considered in the survey consists of 1
Houses, flats or holiday homes, including timeshares (except the current home) 2 Farm or
Business Property (such as a shop, warehouse or garage) 3 land 4 Money owed by others
5 A trust 6 A covenant or inheritance 7 Other assets such as works of art or collectibles.
The values of these were appraised using the market value. The debt that was generated
through the purchase of houses is mortgage. The mortgage type, rate, how much left to
pay and how many years to run were collected and imputed. Apart from mortgage, other
financial debt including money owned in credit cards, overdrafts and other private debt
also were taken into consideration. Log function was also applied to NTW before being
inputted into the probit model (lnNTW).
Health factors are key official criteria and need to be controlled. The health variables that
we considered emphasize the effects from self-evaluated health level and the needs of
care. Specifically, they are self-rated health (SRH), ADL score(ADL), total formal care
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cost (TFCC) and total informal care cost (TIFCC).
SRH is an overall rate of the self-perceived level of health by the participants, implicitly
including the considerations of both mental and physical health. The levels of SRH are 1.
Poor 2. Fair 3. Good 4. Very good 5. Excellent, and this variable was transformed into
five dummy variables.
The variable of ADL shows a score based on the number of daily living activities that
the participants could not manage to do. This was an evaluation of their daily care needs,
which is also an indicator of their disability level. The activities that were considered
in this variable included activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental activities of
daily living (IADL). ADLs focus on basic skills and one’s ability to take care of one’s
own body. IADLs need more advanced skills and generally require the use of executive
functions, social skills and more complex environmental interactions (Foti and Koketsu,
2013). There are a total of 15 daily living activities in this variable1.
Care Section is included in the ELSA for the first time in Wave 6. In constructing the vari-
ables of TFCC and TIFCC, after categorizing the data of hours of help given by formal or
informal care givers, different rates of hourly care cost were applied. But the differences
in the volumes and the number of care receivers for TFCC and TIFCC were substantial.
In the sample, 447 participants had formal care cost,while 1, 135 people had informal
care cost. To better capture their linear relationships with the dependent variable, log was
applied to the variables of TFCC and TIFCC (lnTFCC and lnTIFCC).
In the probit model analysis, socio-demographic variables of age (Age), gender (Gender),
marital status (MS), purchase of insurance (Insurance), hobby or pastime (Hobby) were
1ADLs include 1. Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks, 2 Walking across a room, 3 Bathing
or showering, 4 Eating, such as cutting up food, 5 Getting in or out of bed, 6 Using the toilet, including
getting up or down, 7 Using a map to figure out how to get around in a strange place, 8 Recognizing when
you are in physical danger; IADLs refer to 9 Preparing a hot meal, 10 Shopping for groceries, 11 Making
telephone calls, 12 Communication (speech, hearing or eyesight), 13 Taking medications, 14 Doing work
around the house or garden, 15 Managing money, such as paying bills and keeping track of expenses. For
more definitions and explanations, please refer to Foti and Koketsu (2013).
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also controlled. The definitions and summary statistics of all the variables can be found
in Appendix 1.
5.3.3 Data Description
To have a better understanding of the data, it was necessary to conduct some preliminary
data analysis. Besides observing histograms to find out how the data was distributed,
correlation coefficients were produced to measure the strength and direction of a linear
relationship between two variables. The two-way table presents shares of participants
who received or did not receive disability benefits of each variable. The histograms and
table of correlation coefficients are in Appendices 2 and 3. The two-way table is presented
below in Table 1.
Income Variables
The histograms of the variable total income and net total wealth (Appendix 2) all showed
right-skewed distributions. Most people had an income level in the range of 0 to 500. The
pillar with an approximate income level of 150 to 200 was the highest.
Suggested from correlation coefficients (Appendix 3), the variables of total income and
total wealth had a moderate association with each other. Both variables of income and
wealth had negative relationships with care cost, ADL Score and low rated health. Dis-
ability benefits had negative relationships with total income and net total wealth.
In the two-way table (Table 1), income and wealth variables were divided separately into
four categories of every 25% weighted sample data. Of the first and second quarter of
the sample who had lower income, 17% of the participants received disability benefits.
In the third quarter of the data, the share of recipients was 11%. Only 7% of people
received disability benefits in the last 25% of the sample. The probability of receiving
disability benefits declined while the level of income increased. People with lower income
were more likely to receive disability benefits. But the differences between the first two
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Table 5.1: Two-way table analysis
RBD
TI 0 1
1(TI≤ 139.78) 83% 17%
2(139.78<TI≤ 217.82) 83% 17%
3(217.82<TI≤ 349.72) 89% 11%
4(TI>349.72) 95% 5%
NTW
1(NTW≤ 95, 340) 76% 24%
2(95,340<NTW≤ 175, 267) 88% 12%
3(175,267<NTW≤ 306, 666) 92% 8%
4(NTW>306,666) 95% 5%
ADL
0 96% 4%
1 87% 13%
2 76% 24%
3 66% 34%
4 56% 44%
5 52% 48%
6 45% 55%
7 32% 68%
8 41% 59%
9 34% 66%
10 34% 66%
11 27% 73%
12 32% 68%
13 16% 84%
14 23% 77%
15 25% 75%
SRH
SRH1 56% 44%
SRH2 79% 21%
SRH3 93% 7%
SRH4 97% 3%
SRH5 98% 2%
TFCC
0 (TFCC=0) 89% 11%
1(TFCC>0) 60% 40%
TIFCC
0 (TIFCC=0) 92% 8%
1(TIFCC>0) 61% 39%
Age
1 (65<Age≤ 75) 90% 10%
2 (75<Age≤ 85) 85% 15%
31 (Ag>85) 69% 31%
Gender
0(Male) 88% 12%
1(Female) 85% 15%
MS
0 (not single) 90% 10%
1 (single) 80% 20%
Insurance
0(Insurance) 92% 8%
1(No insurance) 81% 19%
Hobby
0 (hobby) 90% 10%
1(No hobby) 86% 14%
Total 4896(86%) 789(14%)
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quarters were not very significant, and it is not fair to draw the conclusion now that the
lower income people have the more likely they are to receive disability benefits. Probit
models had to be implemented not only in the whole sample but also in each equal-
divided income group and among groups, under the circumstances that more variables
were controlled.
The trend in the two-way table between net total wealth and the receipt of disability
benefits was more distinctive. The weighting of the recipients of the four wealth groups
declined quite rapidly to, 24%, 12%, 8% and 5%. This indicates that the groups who held
less net total wealth had higher probabilities of receiving disability benefits. Similarly
with the variable of income, the variable of wealth could not only be observed from the
frequencies of dependent variable happening but needed to be implemented in and among
groups with other variables controlled. This benefits us in understanding more about the
criteria or subjective standards on individuals’ financial status when giving out disability
benefits.
Health Variables
Health variables are also significant variables in examining the relationships with the re-
ceipt of disability benefits. We assume that the individuals with more severe health prob-
lems are more likely to get disability benefits.
In the two-way table, self-rated health showed an obvious trend of decreasing proportions
of the recipients of disability benefits. The ADL variable revealed that the shares of the
recipients increased rapidly when the scores increased. Although the percentages had
ups and downs, they increased on more than 50% after score 6 and over 70% after score
13. Generally, the two-way table showed that the worse the self-rated health was, or the
higher the ADL scores were, the more likely people were to receive disability benefits.
The histograms of formal care cost and informal care cost showed that most of the care
receivers had a weekly formal care cost under £500 and informal care cost under £1200.
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Total informal care cost and total care cost had a very weak association, with the correla-
tion coefficient being 0.07, which showed that informal care and formal care were almost
substitutive. For the participants 20% had informal care cost while only nearly 8% had
formal care cost. This reflects the phenomenon that most people who are in need of care
rely on informal care.
Suggested from the two-way table, among the people who had formal care cost, 40% of
them were recipients of disability benefits.This share was quite similar to the people who
had informal care cost, where 39% of them received disability benefits.
Individuals with relatively poor health and in need of care were more likely to receive dis-
ability benefits. This matches the expectations of the relationships between the dependent
variable and the health variables.
Other Variables
Socio-demographic factors are important variables to be controlled. Three groups were
formed in the variable of age to generate the two-way table. The first group contained
participants who were over age 65 and under 75, and the second group was for those
between 75 to 85, the third group was for the over 85 year olds. The proportions of
people who received disability benefits of each age group were 9.1%, 8.7% and 9.8%,
which does not show a very distinctive trend.
The two-way table showed that more women received disability benefits. The proportions
of recipients were 12% for male and 15% for female. It is worth noting that of the 5,685
participants, 3,066 were female and 2,619 were male. The data involved more women
than men in the first place.
The marriage status is also a bivariate variable and has two groups. Although the pro-
portions of disability benefits recipients were quite close, the number of participants who
were in a married or civil partner situation were 3,643, and it was more than the number
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Table 5.2: Instrumental variable analysis on endogenous variables
lnTFCC Coef. Std.Err. t P>t 95% Conf.Interval
Ho1 -0.993 0.168 -5.93 0 -1.322 -0.665
Ho2 -0.958 0.167 -5.74 0 -1.285 -0.631
Ho3 -1.026 0.168 -6.10 0 -1.356 -0.696
Ho4 -0.521 0.173 -3.01 0.003 -0.860 -0.182
NOH -0.057 0.024 -2.35 0.019 -0.104 -0.009
lnTIFCC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% Conf.Interval
Ho1 -0.605 0.268 -2.26 0.024 -1.130 -0.080
Ho2 -0.588 0.267 -2.2 0.028 -1.111 -0.065
Ho3 -0.358 0.269 -1.33 0.183 -0.886 0.169
Ho4 -0.404 0.276 -1.46 0.144 -0.946 0.138
NOH 0.101 0.039 2.6 0.009 0.025 0.177
Wald test of exogeneity chi square=1.24, p=0.5392
of people who were single, divorced or widowed, which was 2,642. The two-way table
still shows 20% of single, divorced or widowed participants received disability benefits,
which was much higher than the other group and only 10% were recipients.
For the variable of insurance, 6.2% of people in the group without personal health insur-
ance were recipients of disability benefits. In the group where people had the insurance,
the proportion was 9.3%.
The last variable is whether a person had a hobby (or pastime). The proportion of the
group 0, who had any hobby or pastime, was 6.7% and the proportion of the group 1,
who did not have a hobby or pastime was 13.1%.
5.4 Endogeneity
We suspect that endogeneity exists between the receipt of disability benefits and care cost
variables. Although the variable of Total Formal Care Cost and Total Informal Care Cost
are correlated, their correlation coefficient is 0.0681 (Appendix 3 Table A2) which is very
small. This means that the formal care cost and informal care cost is mostly substitutive.
It is highly likely that they are affected by different instrumental variables.
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Informal care is mainly carried out by relatives or cohabitants. The variable of informal
care cost should have strong links with the number of household members. Meanwhile,
the receipt of disability benefits is not affected by the status of the household constructions
but only affected by the circumstances of the individual. So the instrumental variable for
informal care is the number of households. The assumption is that, the more household
members an individual has, he or she will have an increasing possibility to receive more
informal care.
Formal care is mainly carried out by workers from formal institutions. The access to
hospitals was chosen to be the instrumental variable of formal care cost. But how it
affects the formal care is worth emphasising. As the survey data that we are using was
from a private residence, formal care was not carried out in formal institutions but where
the participants lived. When in need of formal care, the more accessible the hospital is,
the less likely the participants require formal care in their homes. Thus the instrumental
variable-access to hospitals should have a negative relationship with the variable of formal
care cost. The access to hospitals has several levels, which are, very easy, quite easy, quite
difficult, very difficult, and unable to go, and they were made into dummy variables.
Employing the IV probit model, the results of the first step are shown in Table 2. It
demonstrates how formal care cost and informal care cost interacts with the instrumental
variables. The sample size in this model analysis was 4546.
The instrumental variable, the access to hospitals, is efficient in explaining formal care
cost, and a negative relationship was found between them. The access to hospitals did
not affect informal care cost, but the number of household members, had a significant
positive effect on it. The Wald test of exogeneity gave a chi square of 1.24, with a p-value
of 0.5392. The exogeneity that the care cost variables had with the receipt of disability
benefits cannot be rejected. Instead of using the IV probit model, this paper used probit
model analysis. But the fact that we have managed to test the endogeneity with valid
instrumental variables is a step forward.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Probit model with the whole sample
Table 5.3: Results of probit model on whole sample
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.013 0.006 -2.410 0.016 -0.024 -0.002
lnNTW -0.009 0.002 -5.940 0.000 -0.012 -0.006
ADL 0.015 0.002 6.750 0.000 0.011 0.019
SRH1 0.104 0.022 4.760 0.000 0.061 0.147
SRH2 0.078 0.020 3.880 0.000 0.039 0.117
SRH3 0.026 0.020 1.320 0.187 -0.013 0.066
SRH4 -0.003 0.021 -0.160 0.873 -0.045 0.038
lnTFCC 0.010 0.003 3.090 0.002 0.004 0.016
lnTIFCC 0.017 0.002 8.100 0.000 0.013 0.021
Age 0.001 0.001 0.980 0.329 -0.001 0.002
Gender -0.019 0.009 -2.130 0.033 -0.036 -0.002
MS 0.015 0.009 1.750 0.081 -0.002 0.033
Hobby 0.004 0.008 0.500 0.620 -0.012 0.021
Insurance -0.025 0.013 -1.880 0.061 -0.052 0.001
Table 3 presents results from the carry-out of the first probit model with marginal effects
reported, which is run to the complete set of the sample. Any missing value made that
observation excluded from this test by default. The sample size of this model analysis
was 4,683. The results that report coefficients can be found in Appendix 4.
The wealth and income variables are significant in deciding on the receipt of disability
benefits. Both variables related negatively with the receipt of disability benefits. Thus
the trend exists that the more income or wealth one has, the less likely the individual is
to receive any disability benefit, given that other variables are held constant. LnTI had
a marginal effect of −0.013, so for each percent of increase of total income, the chance
of the participant receiving disability benefits decreased by 1.3%. With the variable of
net total wealth, the marginal effect being -0.009 shows that increasing one percent in net
total asset made the possibility of receiving disability benefits decrease by 0.9%.
The factors of formal care cost and informal care cost both generated significant positive
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coefficients, which suggest that people with higher informal care cost or formal care cost
are more likely to have disability benefits when other variables are kept unchanged. The
marginal effects of log of formal care cost and informal care cost were 0.010 and 0.017.
This means that given per unit change of the independent variables, the possibility for the
receipt of disability benefits happening moved 1 % and 1.7 % in the same direction. The
scope of change of possibility due to informal care cost was bigger than that of the formal
care cost.
The ADL score shows a positive relationship with the receipt of disability benefits. The
higher the ADL score was, the more limiting the participant’s daily life was, the higher
the possibility was to receive the benefits. For each other activity that the participants
could not manage to finish, the chance of the participants receiving disability benefits
increased by 1.5%. The first two levels of self-rated health, which are poor and fair,
were significant in affecting the possibility of the dependent variable happening. The
change from the excellent health level to poor health level increased the chance of a person
receiving disability benefits by 10.4%. If the health level changed from excellent to fair
instead, the possibility of receiving disability benefits increased by 7.8%.
In the model, the results of socio-demographic factors were found not quite as expected.
The variable of age was not a significant variable, which means participants’ age did not
affect the decisions of giving out disability benefits. Gender was significant in deciding
the receipt of disability benefits. But unlike the initial data analysis, the results show that
men are more likely to receive disability benefits than women. This is because using the
whole set of variables decreased the sample size and changed the proportions of men and
women. The marital status, whether for purchases of insurance and whether a person has
a hobby or pastime was not significant in the model.
The targeting of the disability benefits are for the people who are in need of long-term
care regardless of the financial status. People in poorer health are much more likely to
receive disability benefits, but the connections between income and wealth and the receipt
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of disability benefit are still evident. To better understand how strong their connections
are, sensitivity and robustness tests were necessary for both variables.
5.5.2 Robustness Tests for Income and Wealth Variables
Table 5.4: Results of probit model on 1st income group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI 0.014 0.014 1.040 0.296 -0.012 0.041
lnNTW -0.012 0.003 -3.460 0.001 -0.018 -0.005
ADL 0.017 0.005 3.660 0.000 0.008 0.027
SRH1 0.161 0.061 2.660 0.008 0.042 0.280
SRH2 0.123 0.057 2.150 0.032 0.011 0.236
SRH3 0.059 0.058 1.030 0.305 -0.054 0.173
SRH4 0.045 0.060 0.750 0.455 -0.073 0.163
lnTFCC 0.009 0.008 1.140 0.253 -0.006 0.025
lnTIFCC 0.025 0.004 5.780 0.000 0.017 0.034
Age 0.001 0.001 0.910 0.363 -0.001 0.004
Gender -0.048 0.024 -2.000 0.045 -0.095 -0.001
MS 0.035 0.022 1.620 0.106 -0.007 0.077
Hobby -0.028 0.020 -1.390 0.165 -0.068 0.012
Insurance -0.009 0.037 -0.250 0.805 -0.081 0.063
Table 5.5: Results of probit model on 2nd income group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI 0.103 0.068 1.500 0.133 -0.031 0.236
lnNTW -0.011 0.003 -3.670 0.000 -0.017 -0.005
ADL 0.022 0.005 4.540 0.000 0.013 0.032
SRH1 0.202 0.071 2.850 0.004 0.063 0.341
SRH2 0.157 0.069 2.280 0.022 0.022 0.291
SRH3 0.094 0.069 1.370 0.169 -0.040 0.229
SRH4 0.070 0.070 0.990 0.320 -0.068 0.207
lnTFCC 0.012 0.008 1.510 0.130 -0.003 0.027
lnTIFCC 0.018 0.005 3.740 0.000 0.009 0.027
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.960 0.335 -0.004 0.001
Gender -0.036 0.020 -1.840 0.066 -0.075 0.002
MS 0.047 0.021 2.240 0.025 0.006 0.087
Hobby 0.007 0.019 0.380 0.701 -0.030 0.044
Insurance -0.087 0.035 -2.470 0.014 -0.155 -0.018
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Table 5.6: Results of probit model on 3rd income group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.008 0.058 -0.140 0.885 -0.122 0.105
lnNTW -0.007 0.004 -1.550 0.121 -0.015 0.002
ADL 0.017 0.005 3.560 0.000 0.008 0.026
SRH1 0.053 0.036 1.450 0.147 -0.019 0.124
SRH2 0.027 0.032 0.840 0.402 -0.036 0.089
SRH3 -0.024 0.032 -0.760 0.449 -0.086 0.038
SRH4 -0.067 0.036 -1.840 0.065 -0.138 0.004
lnTFCC 0.008 0.007 1.250 0.211 -0.005 0.021
lnTIFCC 0.014 0.004 3.400 0.001 0.006 0.023
Age 0.001 0.001 0.700 0.483 -0.002 0.003
Gender -0.010 0.017 -0.580 0.562 -0.043 0.023
MS -0.013 0.018 -0.710 0.478 -0.048 0.022
Hobby 0.038 0.017 2.270 0.023 0.005 0.070
Insurance -0.009 0.031 -0.300 0.766 -0.069 0.051
Table 5.7: Results of probit model on 4th income group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.034 0.019 -1.800 0.072 -0.072 0.003
lnNTW -0.003 0.005 -0.670 0.502 -0.013 0.006
ADL 0.002 0.003 0.750 0.454 -0.004 0.009
SRH1 0.048 0.032 1.480 0.139 -0.015 0.111
SRH2 0.059 0.027 2.140 0.033 0.005 0.113
SRH3 0.032 0.027 1.190 0.234 -0.021 0.084
SRH4 0.010 0.028 0.350 0.729 -0.045 0.064
lnTFCC 0.013 0.004 3.190 0.001 0.005 0.021
lnTIFCC 0.011 0.003 3.620 0.000 0.005 0.018
Age 0.001 0.001 0.990 0.323 -0.001 0.002
Gender 0.001 0.012 0.080 0.937 -0.023 0.025
MS -0.009 0.012 -0.710 0.477 -0.033 0.016
Hobby -0.011 0.013 -0.810 0.419 -0.037 0.016
Insurance -0.018 0.013 -1.410 0.158 -0.044 0.007
To conduct the robustness tests, income and wealth variables were divided into four equal-
shared groups, and probit models were carried out within these income and wealth groups
separately. The purpose was to examine how the receipt of disability benefits is related
to income and wealth factors when the participants are set in different range and financial
positions. The results can show us which groups of the society are targeted and well
covered by the current disability social benefits, and it can help the government understand
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better about the structure of the recipients and the performance of the current services.
Participants were divided into four equal groups by the income variable first. The dividing
points of their incomes were £139.78, £217.82 and £349.72. The sample sizes of the four
probit models on these four groups were 1069, 1127, 1213 and 1275. The differences in
sample size were due to the omissions of participants who had missing data after adding
other variables.
The results are shown in Tables 5.4-5.7. Under such conditions, the variable of income
did not show significant relationships with the receipt of disability benefits in all four
groups. So when the variance of income was lower, income differences did not account
significantly regarding the chance of receiving disability benefits. But the variable of net
total wealth showed significant negative coefficients in the first two groups. The marginal
effects of them were−0.012 and−0.011. The chance of becoming recipients of disability
benefit grew by 1.2% and 1.1% separately when net total wealth rose 1% within income
group 1 and 2. This was higher than the marginal effect in the probit model of the com-
plete sample. In lower income groups, the connections between wealth differences and
the receipt of disability benefits was stronger.
In the first and second income group, total ADL score and poor and fair health level were
also proven to have effects on the dependent variable. The strong relationships between
the health factors were more reflected in the lower income groups as only one of these
three variables was significant in the last two income groups. Total formal care cost was
only significant in the fourth income group, and informal care cost was significant in all
four groups. This reflects the facts that the recipients of formal care cost were more likely
to have high income, and most care receivers relied on informal care.
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Table 5.8: Results of probit model on 1st wealth group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI 0.000 0.017 0.020 0.980 -0.033 0.034
lnNTW1 -0.010 0.004 -2.600 0.009 -0.018 -0.002
ADL 0.021 0.006 3.320 0.001 0.009 0.033
SRH1 0.168 0.076 2.210 0.027 0.019 0.317
SRH2 0.118 0.072 1.630 0.102 -0.024 0.260
SRH3 0.037 0.073 0.500 0.614 -0.106 0.180
SRH4 -0.007 0.077 -0.090 0.926 -0.159 0.144
lnTFCC 0.026 0.009 2.790 0.005 0.008 0.044
lnTIFCC 0.028 0.005 5.180 0.000 0.018 0.039
Age -0.002 0.002 -1.410 0.159 -0.006 0.001
Gender -0.006 0.026 -0.240 0.809 -0.057 0.045
MS 0.035 0.025 1.380 0.169 -0.015 0.085
Hobby -0.043 0.024 -1.780 0.075 -0.091 0.004
Insurance -0.154 0.064 -2.390 0.017 -0.280 -0.028
Table 5.9: Results of probit model on 2nd wealth group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.010 0.011 -0.860 0.390 -0.032 0.012
lnNTW2 -0.063 0.046 -1.360 0.174 -0.154 0.028
ADL 0.019 0.005 4.080 0.000 0.010 0.028
SRH1 0.050 0.042 1.190 0.233 -0.032 0.132
SRH2 0.021 0.037 0.550 0.582 -0.053 0.094
SRH3 -0.022 0.037 -0.590 0.558 -0.095 0.051
SRH4 -0.071 0.041 -1.710 0.087 -0.151 0.010
lnTFCC -0.003 0.008 -0.350 0.724 -0.018 0.013
lnTIFCC 0.018 0.004 4.220 0.000 0.010 0.027
Age 0.001 0.001 0.830 0.405 -0.001 0.004
Gender -0.036 0.019 -1.910 0.056 -0.072 0.001
MS 0.023 0.019 1.230 0.218 -0.014 0.061
Hobby 0.013 0.017 0.750 0.454 -0.021 0.047
Insurance -0.030 0.028 -1.070 0.286 -0.085 0.025
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Table 5.10: Results of probit model on 3rd wealth group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.013 0.011 -1.130 0.259 -0.035 0.009
lnNTW3 -0.075 0.042 -1.760 0.078 -0.158 0.008
ADL 0.015 0.004 4.080 0.000 0.008 0.023
SRH1 0.108 0.043 2.520 0.012 0.024 0.193
SRH2 0.088 0.040 2.180 0.029 0.009 0.167
SRH3 0.047 0.040 1.180 0.240 -0.031 0.124
SRH4 0.025 0.041 0.620 0.535 -0.055 0.106
lnTFCC 0.004 0.005 0.820 0.415 -0.006 0.015
lnTIFCC 0.009 0.004 2.530 0.011 0.002 0.017
Age 0.002 0.001 2.480 0.013 0.001 0.004
Gender -0.019 0.015 -1.260 0.208 -0.049 0.011
MS 0.000 0.015 -0.030 0.980 -0.030 0.030
Hobby 0.030 0.014 2.110 0.035 0.002 0.058
Insurance 0.010 0.026 0.390 0.696 -0.040 0.060
Table 5.11: Results of probit model on 4th wealth group
RDB Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.012 0.008 -1.530 0.126 -0.026 0.003
lnNTW4 0.006 0.011 0.560 0.574 -0.016 0.028
ADL 0.006 0.003 2.250 0.025 0.001 0.012
SRH1 0.056 0.028 2.000 0.045 0.001 0.112
SRH2 0.051 0.024 2.130 0.033 0.004 0.099
SRH3 0.015 0.024 0.620 0.533 -0.032 0.062
SRH4 0.018 0.024 0.730 0.464 -0.030 0.065
lnTFCC 0.013 0.004 3.180 0.001 0.005 0.021
lnTIFCC 0.011 0.003 3.750 0.000 0.005 0.017
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.720 0.469 -0.002 0.001
Gender 0.005 0.011 0.410 0.684 -0.018 0.027
MS 0.009 0.011 0.800 0.423 -0.013 0.031
Hobby 0.011 0.011 0.940 0.348 -0.012 0.033
Insurance -0.021 0.012 -1.830 0.067 -0.044 0.001
Tables 5.8-5.11 show the results of the probit model in the four wealth groups. The di-
viding points of the wealth groups were £95,340, £175,267 and £306,667. The sample
sizes were 1, 015, 1, 206, 1, 241, 1, 222. The variable of net total wealth shows a signifi-
cant negative relationship with the receipt of disability benefits in the first wealth group.
This suggests that in the group where people had less wealth, the wealthier one was the
less chance was to receive disability benefits. The marginal effect was 0.010, which was
slightly higher than that in the complete sample. But in the other three wealth groups, net
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total wealth was not significant. But it is observable that the variance of net total wealth
was huge and the scale of wealth became very big even after second group. The effects
from the income factor on the dependent variable could not be found in all the wealth
groups.
The connections of health factors and the receipt of disability benefits were more con-
sistent across the wealth groups than the income groups. But the marginal effects in the
lower wealth groups were more than in the higher wealth groups and much higher than in
the complete sample, especially the poor self-rated health in the first wealth group. Com-
pared to the excellent health level, a poor health observant had a 16.8% greater chance to
receive disability benefits.
The effects that income and wealth factors had on the receipt of disability benefits were
not consistently significant when individuals were put into groups with similar finance
status. But the negative relationship that net total wealth had with the dependent variable
could be found in the lowest income group and the first two wealth groups. However,
income factor did not significantly affect the receipt of disability benefits in any group.
To examine their relationships further, the next step was to set the variables of income
and wealth into ten dummy variables representing ten different income and wealth levels
from low to high. By dividing the income and wealth more specifically, we could analyze
how the wealth and income level affected the dependent variable when comparisons were
made among refinery levels.
Table 5.12 shows the results of the probit model on income and wealth dummy vari-
ables. The variable of total income shows consistently a significant positive coefficient
and marginal effects with all nine dummy variables. This indicates the fact that compared
to the highest income level, people at lower income level were more likely to receive
disability benefits. Meanwhile the marginal effects were generally higher in the first five
dummy variables than in the later ones. This showed that the lower the income level an
individual was on, the greater the chance they had of receiving disability benefit. For
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Table 5.12: Results of probit model on income and wealth dummies
RBD Mar.Eff. Std. Err. z P¿z 95% Conf. Interval
TI1 0.081 0.027 2.990 0.003 0.028 0.133
TI2 0.108 0.026 4.160 0.000 0.057 0.159
TI3 0.072 0.026 2.750 0.006 0.021 0.124
TI4 0.094 0.026 3.670 0.000 0.044 0.145
TI5 0.106 0.025 4.160 0.000 0.056 0.155
TI6 0.077 0.026 3.010 0.003 0.027 0.127
TI7 0.087 0.026 3.370 0.001 0.036 0.137
TI8 0.065 0.026 2.480 0.013 0.014 0.116
TI9 0.079 0.026 3.080 0.002 0.029 0.129
NTW1 0.071 0.020 3.570 0.000 0.032 0.110
NTW2 0.028 0.020 1.380 0.169 -0.012 0.067
NTW3 0.032 0.020 1.580 0.114 -0.008 0.071
NTW4 0.025 0.020 1.220 0.223 -0.015 0.064
NTW5 -0.001 0.021 -0.050 0.963 -0.041 0.039
NTW6 0.020 0.020 1.020 0.309 -0.019 0.060
NTW7 0.007 0.021 0.320 0.753 -0.034 0.048
NTW8 -0.037 0.023 -1.600 0.109 -0.082 0.008
NTW9 -0.029 0.023 -1.240 0.215 -0.074 0.017
ADL 0.015 0.002 6.670 0.000 0.010 0.019
SRH1 0.104 0.022 4.740 0.000 0.061 0.148
SRH2 0.074 0.020 3.640 0.000 0.034 0.114
SRH3 0.022 0.020 1.110 0.269 -0.017 0.062
SRH4 -0.006 0.021 -0.260 0.792 -0.048 0.036
lnTFCC 0.011 0.003 3.230 0.001 0.004 0.017
lnTIFCC 0.017 0.002 8.270 0.000 0.013 0.021
Age 0.000 0.001 0.820 0.411 -0.001 0.002
Gender -0.019 0.009 -2.100 0.036 -0.036 -0.001
MS 0.012 0.009 1.330 0.184 -0.006 0.030
Hobby 0.003 0.008 0.360 0.720 -0.013 0.020
Insurance -0.034 0.014 -2.400 0.017 -0.061 -0.006
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example, if one’s income level has dropped from the 10th group to the 2nd group, the
possibility for this participant to receive disability benefit increases 10.8%. But changing
from the 10th group to 8th group only increases the possibility by 6.5%.
But when comparing wealth groups, only the first dummy variable showed a significant
result. This suggests that except for the comparisons made between individuals who held
the most and less wealth, the differences in other wealth levels did not affect the receipt
of disability benefits. The marginal effect of the first dummy was 0.071 suggesting that
the change from the 10th group to the 1st increases the possibility to receive disability
benefits by 7.1%.
Testing the ten dummies of income and wealth variables, income factor showed a stronger
and more consistent negative relationship with the receipt of disability benefits, while the
wealth factor was only significant when the highest and lowest level was compared. This
can be due to the fact that income dominates individuals’ daily consumptions, which is
more connected to one’s life standard. Although wealth comes in larger amounts, it is less
flexible to use.
5.6 Discussion
Testing the outcomes of the disability benefits, individuals with better financial status were
less likely to receive disability benefits. Although Attendance Allowance and Disability
Living Allowance aim to provide benefits to those who have care needs and are over
65, regardless of the claimants’ income or wealth level, the results show that the access
to these benefits has significant connections with a person’s income and wealth level,
which are similar effects to means-tested policies. There exists a self-selection process
as opportunity cost can be generated during the claiming. When the opportunity cost of
the claim is larger than the benefits that could be gained, individuals choose not to claim.
Richer people have a higher opportunity cost to claim, so the initiatives for the richer
people to claim are lower. On the other hand, the chance of having more severe disability
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is higher among the poorer people, and their opportunity to receive disability benefits
is higher. Also, the artificial factors cannot be neglected. The process of the decision-
making for a claim is entirely controlled by assessors. With the complex disability status
being very hard to transform into very accurate and detailed guidelines, sometimes the
subjective criteria can make decisions very different even on similar cases.
In the robustness tests where four equalized groups of different income or wealth level
were formed, the factor of income did not show a distinctive relationship with the re-
ceipt of disability benefits in any group. In groups where the sample size was reduced
and the variances of wealth and income were much smaller, income factor did not affect
the chance of getting disability benefits. However, in the lower income groups, met total
wealth was an essential parameter influencing the outcomes of receiving disability bene-
fits. Wealth represents households’ assets, and has more dramatic changes in scale than
income. Compared to income, a much lower wealth level can reflect better of a person’s
limited financial resource. When we targeted lower income groups, the wealth differences
became striking. In the four wealth groups, only the group with the lowest wealth range,
showed the significance of net total wealth. Thus, when people from similar income or
wealth level were observed, the self-selection process based on income level was not very
distinctive, but participants’ wealth became an important role in the underlying means test
process.
After investigating the income and wealth as ten divided levels, compared with highest
level, all the participants of other income levels had significantly higher chances to receive
disability benefits. Only the lowest wealth level had an increasing possibility to become
benefit recipients when compared to those in the highest wealth level. Compared the same
income level, the targeting of the disability benefits is the people of lower wealth levels.
But when it was in a wider range of income, the significance of the relationships between
income and the receipt of disability benefits was more consistent. It is fair to say that the
level of income starting self-selecting was quite high and covered most of the participants.
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Compared to local LTC services, the coverage of disability cash benefits was less limiting.
It is necessary to keep and strengthen the disability cash benefits for elderly people, rather
than just diverting them to expand the public private care services of local authorities.
5.7 Conclusions
This paper has looked into the issue of the elderly’s long-term care (LTC) benefit policies
in England, focusing on the disability benefit targeting and effectiveness. By applying
the method of the probit model and relevant robustness tests to 5685 observations from
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) of people who were 65 and over, this
paper has analyzed mainly the roles of income and wealth in affecting the chances of
individuals receiving the non means-tested disability benefits. This can help the policy
makers to understand better the financial structures of the recipients and how the LTC
disability benefits are carried out in real life. During the analysis, instrumental variables
of care cost were found and its endogeneity problem with the receipt of disability benefits
was studied by using the IV probit approach.
The results of the IV probit show that the access to hospital and the number of members
in a household can be used as valid instrumental variables for the endogenous variables
of total formal care cost and total informal care cost. Although the causations between
care cost and the receipt of disability benefits are believed to flow in both directions, the
endogeneity between them was not detected. It was therefore safe to use the probit model
to evaluate the data.
The probit model was used to test under what circumstances of the independent variables
the dependant variable - the receipt of disability benefits was more likely to happen. The
results show that individuals with higher income or wealth were less likely to receive dis-
ability benefits, regardless of the non means-tested design. The disability cash benefits
performed similarly with the means-tested policy due to a self-selection process. Robust-
ness tests showed that in smaller groups where the level of income or wealth was similar
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and the variances were small, the income factor did not have effects on the results of
whether participants became recipients of the benefits, but the wealth factor was shown to
be significant in the lower income or wealth groups. When compared to a higher level of
income, the income variable showed a consistent significant negative effect on the receipt
of disability benefit. The wealth factor also showed a significant relationship with the
dependent variable when the lowest was compared with the highest wealth level. Overall,
the disability benefits of AA and DLA are provided to those who are most in need of care
and in the worst financial positions.
Income is a factor that shows more of the individuals’ lifestyle and ability of consumption,
and wealth is a more significant variable in assessing the financial differences, and can be
more efficient in distinguishing the people who are in the worst financial conditions. Both
of them are important assessments in giving out benefits. Some policies consider the
effects from income or wealth in the criteria, but even for those which do not mention
financial status in their criteria, both factors still have a profound influence on the carry-
out and outcomes of the policies. When the government chooses to focus on either the
state cash benefits, or the personal care provided from the local authorities, it is necessary
to understand that individuals’ financial status has already been taken into consideration.
This paper has focused on testing income and wealth factors, so did not analyse other con-
trolled variables more specifically. The results section shows a different result on gender
divide from the preliminary analysis. The dropping of the lifestyle factors of the hobby
and insurance variable result to the insignificance of the gender variable Appendix 5. The
gender divide problem is not found in this case. Another limitation was that the data was
collected from England, and this paper analysed the problem treating England as a whole.
The geographic differences that are within England was not taken into consideration. The
average income and wealth level of individuals have great differences when comparing
those from the London area and other places. If the data of more specific areas can be ac-
quired, further research can take into consideration different areas to analyse the problems
of income divide.
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5.8 Appendices
5.8.1 Appendix 1 Variables Definitions and Statistics Summary
Table A1: Variables definitions and statistics summary
Var Definition Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Dependent variable
RDB The receipt of disability benefits
Receiving either AA or DLA (1)
Neither receiving AA or DLA
(0)
5,595 8.43 25.92
Income and Wealth variables
TI Total Income 5,555 292.59 415.28
NTW Net Total Wealth 5,555 258,081.30 419.100.50
Health Variables
SRH1 Self-rated Health - Poor 5350 0.09 0.29
SRH2 Self-rated Health - Fair 5350 0.23 0.42
SRH3 Self-rated Health - Good 5350 0.33 0.47
SRH4 Self-rated Health - Very good 5350 0.27 0.44
SRH5 Self-rated Health - Excellent 5350 0.08 0.28
ADL Number of Activities of Daily
living
5681 1.19 2.55
TIFCC Total Informal Care Cost 5685 50.02 205.67
TFCC Total Formal Care Cost 5685 10.38 79.83
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age Age 5685 74.10 7.00
Gender Female (1) or Male (0) 5685 0.54 0.50
MS Marital Status:
A civil partner, married orre-
married(0);
Single, divorced or widowed (1)
5685 0.36 0.48
Insurance Whether purchased private
health insurance:
Purchased (0);
Not purchased (1)
5677 0.91 0.29
Hobby Whether have a hobby or pas-
time
Have (0);
Do not have(1)
4834 0.23 0.42
Instrumental Variables
Ho1 Access to Hospitals-Very easy 4699 0.37 0.48
Ho2 Access to Hospitals-Quite easy 4699 0.45 0.50
Ho3 Access to Hospitals-Quite diffi-
cult
4699 0.12 0.33
Ho4 Access to Hospitals-Very diffi-
cult
4699 0.04 0.20
Ho5 Access to Hospitals-Unable to
go
4699 0.01 0.08
NOH Number of Household Members 5685 1.78 0.69
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5.8.2 Appendix 2 Histograms of Variables
Figure A1: Histograms of total income
Figure A2: Histograms of net total wealth
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Figure A3: Histograms of health variables
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5.8.3 Appendix 3 Correlation Coefficients
5.8.4 Appendix 4 Probit Models with Coefficients Reported
Table A3: Results of probit model on whole sample (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.103 0.043 -2.410 0.016 -0.187 -0.019
lnNTW -0.072 0.012 -5.910 0.000 -0.096 -0.048
ADL 0.115 0.017 6.680 0.000 0.081 0.149
SRH1 0.807 0.169 4.770 0.000 0.475 1.138
SRH2 0.602 0.155 3.890 0.000 0.299 0.906
SRH3 0.204 0.154 1.320 0.186 -0.099 0.507
SRH4 -0.026 0.163 -0.160 0.873 -0.346 0.294
lnTFCC 0.078 0.025 3.080 0.002 0.028 0.127
lnTIFCC 0.129 0.016 8.060 0.000 0.097 0.160
Age 0.004 0.005 0.980 0.329 -0.004 0.013
Gender -0.144 0.067 -2.140 0.033 -0.276 -0.012
MS 0.118 0.068 1.750 0.080 -0.014 0.251
Hobby 0.032 0.066 0.500 0.621 -0.096 0.161
Insurance -0.195 0.104 -1.880 0.060 -0.398 0.009
cons -0.750 0.456 -1.640 0.100 -1.644 0.144
Table A4: Results of probit model on 1st income group (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI1 0.091 0.087 1.040 0.296 -0.079 0.261
lnNTW -0.074 0.022 -3.420 0.001 -0.117 -0.032
ADL 0.112 0.031 3.600 0.000 0.051 0.172
SRH1 1.033 0.390 2.650 0.008 0.269 1.796
SRH2 0.790 0.368 2.150 0.032 0.068 1.512
SRH3 0.381 0.371 1.030 0.305 -0.347 1.108
SRH4 0.289 0.387 0.750 0.455 -0.469 1.047
lnTFCC 0.058 0.051 1.140 0.253 -0.042 0.158
lnTIFCC 0.160 0.028 5.660 0.000 0.105 0.216
Age 0.008 0.009 0.910 0.363 -0.009 0.025
Gender -0.308 0.154 -2.000 0.046 -0.610 -0.006
MS 0.223 0.138 1.620 0.105 -0.047 0.493
Hobby -0.181 0.131 -1.390 0.165 -0.438 0.075
Insurance -0.058 0.235 -0.250 0.805 -0.518 0.403
cons -2.042 0.861 -2.370 0.018 -3.730 -0.355
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Table A5: Results of probit model on 2st income group (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI2 0.631 0.421 1.500 0.134 -0.194 1.457
lnNTW -0.068 0.019 -3.620 0.000 -0.104 -0.031
ADL 0.137 0.031 4.430 0.000 0.076 0.198
SRH1 1.243 0.436 2.850 0.004 0.388 2.098
SRH2 0.965 0.422 2.290 0.022 0.139 1.792
SRH3 0.581 0.422 1.380 0.168 -0.246 1.407
SRH4 0.429 0.431 0.990 0.320 -0.416 1.273
lnTFCC 0.072 0.048 1.510 0.131 -0.021 0.165
lnTIFCC 0.110 0.030 3.690 0.000 0.052 0.169
Age -0.008 0.009 -0.960 0.335 -0.025 0.009
Gender -0.223 0.121 -1.830 0.067 -0.460 0.015
MS 0.287 0.128 2.240 0.025 0.036 0.537
Hobby 0.045 0.116 0.380 0.701 -0.183 0.272
Insurance -0.533 0.217 -2.460 0.014 -0.957 -0.108
cons -3.707 2.274 -1.630 0.103 -8.164 0.751
Table A6: Results of probit model on 3rd income group (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI3 -0.064 0.444 -0.140 0.885 -0.934 0.805
lnNTW -0.051 0.033 -1.540 0.123 -0.116 0.014
ADL 0.131 0.037 3.520 0.000 0.058 0.203
SRH1 0.403 0.278 1.450 0.147 -0.142 0.948
SRH2 0.205 0.245 0.840 0.401 -0.274 0.685
SRH3 -0.183 0.242 -0.760 0.449 -0.659 0.292
SRH4 -0.511 0.276 -1.850 0.064 -1.053 0.031
lnTFCC 0.063 0.050 1.250 0.212 -0.036 0.161
lnTIFCC 0.111 0.033 3.390 0.001 0.047 0.175
Age 0.006 0.009 0.700 0.483 -0.012 0.024
Gender -0.075 0.130 -0.580 0.562 -0.330 0.179
MS -0.098 0.138 -0.710 0.478 -0.368 0.172
Hobby 0.290 0.128 2.270 0.023 0.039 0.540
Insurance -0.070 0.235 -0.300 0.766 -0.531 0.391
cons -1.062 2.597 -0.410 0.683 -6.153 4.029
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Table A7: Results of probit model on 4th income group (Coef.)
RDB Mar. Eff. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI4 -0.512 0.280 -1.830 0.068 -1.061 0.037
lnNTW -0.048 0.071 -0.670 0.502 -0.187 0.092
ADL 0.037 0.049 0.750 0.454 -0.060 0.133
SRH1 0.712 0.476 1.500 0.135 -0.221 1.645
SRH2 0.878 0.403 2.180 0.029 0.089 1.668
SRH3 0.476 0.397 1.200 0.230 -0.302 1.253
SRH4 0.144 0.415 0.350 0.728 -0.670 0.958
lnTFCC 0.198 0.061 3.230 0.001 0.078 0.318
lnTIFCC 0.170 0.046 3.720 0.000 0.081 0.260
Age 0.012 0.012 0.990 0.323 -0.012 0.035
Gender 0.014 0.183 0.080 0.937 -0.344 0.372
MS -0.133 0.186 -0.710 0.477 -0.498 0.233
Hobby -0.163 0.201 -0.810 0.417 -0.556 0.231
Insurance -0.274 0.193 -1.420 0.155 -0.652 0.104
cons 0.684 2.059 0.330 0.740 -3.352 4.720
Table A8: Results of probit model on 1st wealth group (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI 0.002 0.074 0.020 0.980 -0.144 0.147
lnNTW1 -0.044 0.017 -2.580 0.010 -0.077 -0.011
ADL 0.092 0.028 3.280 0.001 0.037 0.147
SRH1 0.738 0.335 2.200 0.028 0.081 1.395
SRH2 0.519 0.318 1.630 0.103 -0.105 1.143
SRH3 0.162 0.321 0.500 0.614 -0.468 0.791
SRH4 -0.032 0.340 -0.090 0.926 -0.698 0.635
lnTFCC 0.112 0.041 2.760 0.006 0.033 0.192
lnTIFCC 0.125 0.025 5.010 0.000 0.076 0.174
Age -0.011 0.008 -1.410 0.159 -0.026 0.004
Gender -0.028 0.114 -0.240 0.809 -0.251 0.196
MS 0.153 0.112 1.370 0.169 -0.065 0.372
Hobby -0.190 0.107 -1.780 0.076 -0.399 0.020
Insurance -0.677 0.285 -2.370 0.018 -1.236 -0.118
cons 0.247 0.765 0.320 0.746 -1.252 1.747
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Table A9: Results of probit model on 2nd wealth group (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.069 0.080 -0.86 0.39 -0.226 0.088
lnNTW2 -0.452 0.332 -1.36 0.173 -1.103 0.199
ADL 0.138 0.034 4.03 0 0.071 0.204
SRH1 0.356 0.299 1.19 0.234 -0.230 0.942
SRH2 0.147 0.267 0.55 0.581 -0.377 0.672
SRH3 -0.157 0.268 -0.59 0.558 -0.683 0.368
SRH4 -0.505 0.294 -1.72 0.086 -1.082 0.071
lnTFCC -0.020 0.056 -0.35 0.724 -0.129 0.090
lnTIFCC 0.130 0.031 4.2 0 0.069 0.190
Age 0.008 0.009 0.83 0.405 -0.010 0.026
Gender -0.256 0.134 -1.91 0.056 -0.518 0.006
MS 0.167 0.136 1.23 0.218 -0.099 0.434
Hobby 0.093 0.124 0.75 0.454 -0.150 0.336
Insurance -0.214 0.200 -1.07 0.286 -0.607 0.179
cons 3.792 3.954 0.96 0.338 -3.959 11.543
Table A10: Results of probit model on 3rd wealth group
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.127 0.112 -1.130 0.258 -0.347 0.093
lnNTW3 -0.751 0.425 -1.770 0.077 -1.584 0.082
ADL 0.153 0.038 4.020 0.000 0.079 0.228
SRH1 1.091 0.429 2.540 0.011 0.250 1.933
SRH2 0.888 0.403 2.210 0.027 0.099 1.677
SRH3 0.470 0.398 1.180 0.238 -0.310 1.249
SRH4 0.256 0.412 0.620 0.534 -0.552 1.064
lnTFCC 0.043 0.053 0.820 0.415 -0.060 0.146
lnTIFCC 0.094 0.037 2.530 0.011 0.021 0.167
Age 0.024 0.010 2.490 0.013 0.005 0.043
Gender -0.193 0.153 -1.260 0.207 -0.494 0.107
MS -0.004 0.154 -0.030 0.980 -0.305 0.298
Hobby 0.301 0.142 2.120 0.034 0.022 0.580
Insurance 0.100 0.257 0.390 0.695 -0.402 0.603
cons 5.722 5.292 1.080 0.280 -4.651 16.094
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Table A11: Results of probit model on 4th wealth group (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.203 0.131 -1.550 0.122 -0.460 0.054
lnNTW4 0.110 0.195 0.560 0.574 -0.272 0.491
ADL 0.111 0.050 2.240 0.025 0.014 0.208
SRH1 0.990 0.486 2.040 0.042 0.037 1.943
SRH2 0.902 0.416 2.170 0.030 0.087 1.717
SRH3 0.262 0.418 0.630 0.531 -0.558 1.082
SRH4 0.309 0.420 0.730 0.463 -0.515 1.133
lnTFCC 0.225 0.069 3.240 0.001 0.089 0.361
lnTIFCC 0.195 0.050 3.920 0.000 0.098 0.293
Age -0.010 0.014 -0.720 0.469 -0.036 0.017
Gender 0.081 0.198 0.410 0.683 -0.307 0.468
MS 0.156 0.194 0.800 0.421 -0.224 0.537
Hobby 0.187 0.199 0.940 0.347 -0.203 0.577
Insurance -0.375 0.202 -1.850 0.064 -0.772 0.022
cons -2.086 2.704 -0.770 0.441 -7.385 3.214
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Table A12: Results of probit model on income and wealth dummies (Coef.)
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
TI1 0.601 0.205 2.930 0.003 0.200 1.003
TI2 0.831 0.198 4.200 0.000 0.443 1.218
TI3 0.539 0.200 2.690 0.007 0.147 0.931
TI4 0.697 0.196 3.560 0.000 0.313 1.081
TI5 0.786 0.193 4.070 0.000 0.408 1.164
TI6 0.594 0.195 3.050 0.002 0.212 0.976
TI7 0.647 0.195 3.320 0.001 0.265 1.030
TI8 0.500 0.199 2.510 0.012 0.110 0.889
TI9 0.609 0.195 3.130 0.002 0.228 0.991
NTW1 0.542 0.153 3.550 0.000 0.243 0.841
NTW2 0.209 0.153 1.360 0.173 -0.092 0.509
NTW3 0.236 0.153 1.540 0.123 -0.064 0.537
NTW4 0.155 0.154 1.010 0.313 -0.146 0.457
NTW5 -0.010 0.157 -0.060 0.951 -0.316 0.297
NTW6 0.162 0.153 1.060 0.290 -0.138 0.461
NTW7 0.023 0.159 0.140 0.886 -0.290 0.335
NTW8 -0.293 0.175 -1.670 0.094 -0.635 0.050
NTW9 -0.242 0.175 -1.380 0.167 -0.585 0.101
ADL 0.158 0.016 9.800 0.000 0.127 0.190
SRH1 0.955 0.170 5.610 0.000 0.622 1.289
SRH2 0.690 0.157 4.380 0.000 0.381 0.998
SRH3 0.246 0.157 1.560 0.118 -0.062 0.555
SRH4 -0.009 0.167 -0.050 0.959 -0.335 0.318
lnTFCC 0.082 0.026 3.220 0.001 0.032 0.132
lnTIFCC 0.130 0.016 8.190 0.000 0.099 0.161
Age 0.009 0.004 2.080 0.037 0.001 0.018
Gender -0.082 0.068 -1.210 0.225 -0.216 0.051
MS 0.119 0.069 1.730 0.084 -0.016 0.255
Hobby 0.018 0.065 0.270 0.785 -0.109 0.144
Insurance -0.272 0.107 -2.540 0.011 -0.482 -0.062
Cons -3.125 0.395 -7.900 0.000 -3.900 -2.350
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5.8.5 Appendix 5 Probit Model dropping the lifestyle factors
Table A13: Results of probit model dropping the lifestyle factors
RDB Coef. Std. Err. z P > z 95% Conf.Interval
lnTI -0.060 0.038 -1.55 0.122 -0.135 -0.016
lnNTW -0.067 0.011 -6.15 0.000 -0.089 -0.046
ADL 0.098 0.015 6.76 0.000 0.070 0.127
SRH1 0.892 0.162 5.50 0.000 0.574 1.210
SRH2 0.667 0.151 4.40 0.000 0.369 0.963
SRH3 0.242 0.152 1.59 0.111 -0.056 0.540
SRH4 0.023 0.160 0.14 0.888 -0.291 0.336
lnTFCC 0.066 0.021 3.13 0.002 0.025 0.108
lnTIFCC 0.142 0.014 9.93 0.000 0.114 0.170
Age 0.005 0.004 1.28 0.202 -0.003 0.013
Gender -0.110 0.061 -1.73 0.084 -0.226 -0.014
MS 0.127 0.062 2.05 0.041 0.005 0.247
cons -1.323 0.406 -3.26 0.001 -2.119 -0.528
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